The Complete Idea of Justice
Lloyd L. Weinrebt
Most writers have agreed with the platonic conception that
justice is giving a person his due.1 There is far less agreement
about what is due a person and how it is determined, but it is understood that the idea of desert is somehow central. So far as justice is concerned, a person is due no less and no more than he deserves. Thus, one path toward an understanding of justice is to
inquire about desert, and, if desert is not treated simply as a synonym for justice, it furnishes a test of results reached in other
ways.2 Justice as desert is contrasted with the idea of entitlement,
with which it is said commonly to be confused.' Entitlements are
the product of rules, which may, but need not, reflect desert and,
therefore, justice. So, although one could not without irony speak
of a person's "unjust deserts," it is often appropriate to speak of a
person's unjust entitlements.4
0 1984 by the author. All rights reserved.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
2 E.g., D. MILLER, SociAL JUSTICE 20 (1976) ("[The most valuable general definition of
justice is that which brings out its distributive character most plainly. justice is suum
cuique, to each his due."); Frankena, The Concept of Social Justice, in SocIAL JUSTICE at 1,
3 (R. Brandt ed. 1962) ("As is stated in an ancient formula, a society is just if it renders to
its various members what is due them."). Plato discusses the nature of justice principally in
the Republic. See especially PLATO, REPUBLic, bk. IV, lines 433-34, where the idea of justice
as each person doing that for which he is suited is stated.
2 J. HosPERs, HUMAN CoNDucT 433 (1961) ("Justice is getting what one deserves; what
could be simpler?"); J. FEINBmEG, Justice and PersonalDesert, in DoING AND DESERVING 55,
55 (1970) (Until the "peculiar perplexities" of the question of what it is to deserve something are resolved, "a full understanding of the nature of justice is impossible, for surely the
concepts of justice and desert are closely connected.").
3 See, e.g., D. MILLER, supra note 1, at 25-26 (observing that "it is fairly clear that
justice as the protection of rights [or entitlements] and justice as desert are conflicting values"), 91 (noting the confusion between desert and entitlement). To the same effect, see J.
FE NERG, supra note 2, at 57-58, 80, 85-87.
4 The ideas that I have identified here as desert and entitlement have been variously
labeled. They are sometimes both labeled as desert, although of different kinds. E.g., B.
BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 106-15 (1965); Kleinig, The Concept of Desert, 8 Am. PHIL. Q.
71, 73-76 (1971). The idea of equality often occupies the place given here to entitlement. See
infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Because, as I argue in this article, desert and
entitlement are united in the complete idea of justice, the distinction is likely to be noted
only in circumstances in which the two manifestly conflict Where they both appear to be
satisfied, either term may serve for the other, and all three terms, desert, entitlement, and
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I shall argue here that the relationship of desert and entitlement is much more complex than this simple outline suggests, and
that it discloses a fundamental antinomy in the concept of justice
itself. The idea of entitlement is as central to a full conception of
justice as is the idea of desert. Not only are they united in the
complete idea of justice; considered separately, they are reciprocal.
Unqualified desert presumes that the conditions of entitlement
have been satisfied as well. Unqualified entitlement satisfies the
conditions of desert. Nevertheless, desert and entitlement are opposed; it is impossible for the same circumstances to satisfy fully
the conditions of both.
This relationship of conjoint dependence and opposition is
prominently displayed in the realm of civil justice, where, I shall
argue, liberty is associated with desert and equality with entitlement. Every principle of liberty presumes the validity of a reciprocal principle of equality, to which another principle of equality is
opposed. Abstractly, without reliance on the conventional understandings of a community, there is no reason to prefer one principle of liberty or equality to another. The effort to describe such
principles as objective, independently valid principles of a just social order necessarily fails, because it is a reflection of the more
general union of desert and entitlement in the idea of justice.
The incompatibility between desert and entitlement is overcome by the assumption of a normative natural order, in which
persons are naturally situated as they deserve. That assumption is
the core of the classical and medieval theories of natural law and
gives it its distinct significance. Far from making natural law unacceptable, such an assumption is necessary not only for the complete idea of justice but also for an account of moral freedom,
without which the idea of a person as morally responsible cannot
be sustained. 5 Desert and entitlement alike identify the individual

justice, may be used more or less interchangeably, according to the aspect of the situation
that is deemed significant. In a previous article, I used the terms "desert" and "entitlement"
somewhat differently and less precisely than I use them here. See Weinreb, Law as Order,
91 HARv. L. REV. 909, 957 & n.138 (1978). Important distinctions within the categories of
desert and entitlement have been noted elsewhere. E.g., J. FEMNBER, supra note 2, at 71-72.
They do not bear on the present argument.
5 Michael Sandel has observed:
Only a world ungoverned by a purposive order leaves principles of justice open to
human construction and conceptions of the good to individual choice. In this the depth
of opposition between deontological liberalism and teleological world views most fully
appears.
Where neither nature nor cosmos supplies a meaningful order to be grasped or
apprehended, it falls to human subjects to constitute meaning on their own.
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as a responsible being-in short as a person-but in different ways.
Only if both are satisfied is it possible to give a person his due,
because only in that case is a person fully realized separately from
the conditions of his existence. Natural law reflects that aspect of
our experience. Positive law reflects the separateness of what is
and what ought to be, which is another, equally ineluctable, aspect
of our experience. The antinomy is complete and final.
I. JUSTICE AS ENTITLEMENT

The simplest manifestation of the idea -of justice is found in
the connection most people make unreflectively between justice
and law." The connection is explicit and immediately apparent,
even in ordinary, incidental details like the names we give to institutions and agents of the law: courts of justice, justices of the
peace, or, more simply, Justice, as we call members of the Supreme
Court. Unlike other basic values, which subsist independently of
law and furnish a standard against which it is tested, in some special way law seems to bring justice into being; the very product and
activity of law, one wants to say, is justice. And although we may
oppose a law strongly on other grounds of principle or policy, an
unjust law troubles us differently; if the injustice is large and clear,
we may question whether it is correct to use the term "law" at all.
The source of this connection is easily traced. A central aspect
of the idea of justice is the application of a determinate rule to a
case to which the rule applies. When this aspect of justice comes
into play, provided that the rule is as stated and without reservations and that it applies to the particular case, it is necessary and
sufficient for justice to be done that the rule be applied, whatever
its specific content. Stated thus generally, this aspect of justice
sounds like a description of law itself. For what is a legal order but
a body of rules assumed to be valid, covering every variety of

M. SANDEL, LRBisAsM AND THE Lmrrs OF JUSTICE 175 (1982).
Sandel argues, as I do here, that a strictly deontological approach to justice is inadequate to sustain a full conception of a person. His solution is not to make the assumption of
natural law. Rather, working in the other direction, he argues that the idea of a person has
to be enriched with the (contingent) phenomena that make us the persons we are; so doing,
we discover in our actual commonality, uncertain and incomplete as it is, the normative
basis that nature does not provide. The demands of justice, he suggests, exist side by side
with this other ground of interpersonal relations, which he calls community. Id. at 179-83.
Although his solution and mine are plainly different, insofar as community provides an objective, "supra-personal" standard of moral judgment (even if it is not unchangeable), the
two solutions converge.
' See H. SIDGWICK,THE METHODS OF ETHICS 265 (7th ed. 1907).
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human affairs, and what is legal process but the application of
7
rules?
We refer to this aspect of justice and use it uncontroversially
all the time. It is displayed prominently in law, but is not limited
to it. In the Iliad, when the Achaeans celebrate the funeral of Patroclus, Achilles announces that he will give prizes to the competitors in a chariot race.8 The prize for the runner-up is a mare. Antilochus finishes in second place. Eumelus, the best charioteer in
the race, finishes last (because the gods are meddling, as usual, and
Athena breaks the yoke holding his horses). Seeing what has happened to Eumelus and feeling "a pang of pity," Achilles suggests
that the first prize go to Diomedes, who has finished first, but,
"The best man is the last to bring his team in.
Come, we'll award him second prize, in fairness."'
Antilochus protests angrily. If Achilles wants to recognize the
merit of Eumelus, let him do so from his store of wealth. Let him
bestow on Eumelus anything he wants, of greater value than the
mare if he chooses. But the prize for second place is his. Everyone
must agree with Antilochus that he is entitled to the prize, and
that it would be unjust to give it to anyone else. 10 Achilles's announcement before the race determined how the prizes were to be
awarded. According to its terms, Antilochus should receive the second prize. That is enough to settle the matter.
Not every rule implicates considerations of justice, however;
nor is every failure to apply a rule an injustice. Justice is not
merely consistency. All sorts of acknowledged rules raise no question of morality, or justice, at all. Although an office rule provides
that internal office memoranda be typed on blue paper and memoranda for outside the office on yellow paper, a secretary in a hurry
commits no injustice if she scribbles a memorandum on white pa7 Rules that concern the legal process itself are sometimes said to contain requirements
of justice, so that a failure to follow them is an independent denial of justice. Lawyers and
legal scholars particularly may think in this way about procedural requirements, like a fair
opportunity for interested parties to be heard, an unbiased judge, etc., which, in the United
States, are called "procedural due process." Such requirements are means of ensuring the

principal demand of justice that rules be correctly applied. They do not have an additional
independent status of their own. Of course, if they are themselves embodied in rules, a
failure to apply those rules constitutes a denial of justice.
8 HoMER,THE ImAD,bk. 23, lines 262-70, at 543-44 (R.Fitzgerald trans. 1974). For the
whole story of the race, see id. lines 262-616, at 543-54.
' Id. lines 534-40, at 552.
10 Except that, as it turns out, Antilochus cheated in the race. But, turn again, his
acknowledgment that he cheated leads Menelaus, who had finished third, to concede the
mare to him. Id. lines 566-613, at 553-54.
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per (even though it may not get to its destination promptly). On
the other hand, justice is not simply morality. Moral principles dictate acts of benevolence, like giving to charity, or simply right conduct, like telling the truth. We are all more or less liable to honor
such principles in thought or word and sometimes not to honor
them in deed; but justice does not exhaust the demands of morality, and a moral shortfall is not invariably an injustice. Indeed, if
one contrasts the strict application of a rule with a merciful or generous act, justice may seem to be the least that morality requires
rather than the most, as Portia tried to convince Shylock. 11
We do not delimit the range of justice either if we simply join
the requirements of consistency and morality in the application of
a specific rule rather than a general moral principle. A person who
regularly stops his car on rainy days to give persons waiting for the
bus a lift does not behave unjustly if one day his mind is on other
things and he fails to stop. The persons waiting at the bus may
suffer from the rain, but they have not suffered an injustice when
the car goes past. 12 And, although consequences for others are relevant, the fact that the correct application of a rule or the failure to
apply it has significant consequences does not itself raise considerations of justice. All sorts of actions guided by a rule, whether a
distinctly moral rule or one involving no moral consideration, benefit or harm the interests of others without being just or unjust. A
seller of office supplies may benefit from the rule about color-coded
memoranda, but he cannot protest of injustice if the rule is ignored. Nor do the people at the bus stop begin to have a claim of
injustice if the regular bus fails to come on schedule, the rain
changes to sleet, and the wind comes up. So far as application of a
rule is concerned, one person may have a valid claim based on justice while another person who suffers far greater loss has no such
claim.
Missing from the cases in which the application of a rule does
not involve considerations of justice is what we have in mind when
we speak of an entitlement. Asked why it would be unjust to deny
Antilochus his prize if Eumelus is the better charioteer, the simplest answer is that, having come in second, Antilochus is entitled

W. SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENmCE, act 4, scene 1.
"If the driver has stopped often for the same persons who are waiting this time and
has induced them to rely on him for a lift, justice may begin to be involved; in that case, we
should say that they have acquired an entitlement. Even then, it would be unkind but not
unjust to pick up those persons and leave others, whom the driver has never picked up and
who know nothing about his practice, standing there dripping.
1
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to it. We are likely, however, to be able to recognize instances of
entitlement more easily than to explain what entitlement is. If it is
not a matter of consistency, or morality, or the extent of the consequences, or of all three together, why does it have the special significance that justice invokes? Clearly it is not enough to say that a
person has an entitlement if it would be unjust not to apply a rule
in his case, since we are seeking to clarify the idea of justice by
reference to entitlement.
The usual explanation is that a person has an entitlement if
he has a right to whatever is in question. The significance that we
attach to entitlements, then, is that they "belong" to the entitled
person, and, if denied, the person is deprived of what is "rightfully" his. The reference to a right distinguishes entitlements from
expected or hoped-for benefits, but, unelaborated, it does little
more. The right in question cannot mean only that someone else
has a corresponding duty. One may have moral duties a failure to
perform which is not an injustice. Evidently only rights (and corresponding duties) of a particular kind give rise to entitlements. If
we sidestep the issues by specifying that an entitlement-creating
right includes anything that a person is due, we have once again
traveled in a circle back to the idea of justice itself.
Casting about for a meaningful connection between entitlements and rights, one may say that entitlements are not only illustrated by reference to law but designated by it. An entitlement is a
legal right, nothing more. Although this statement reflects the
main part of the common understanding, it is itself puzzling. For
the limitation of entitlements to legal rights seems to add nothing
except that an entitlement be enforceable. There is in principle no
reason why the content of a law may not be embodied in an unenforceable rule. But if enforceability is a requirement of justice, the
worst arguments of Callicles seem to be realized, and there is nothing finally to distinguish justice (as opposed to morality) from
force.1 3 That may lead to the conclusion that entitlement is not a
matter of justice at all but strictly a matter of law, whether or not
an entitlement is just being a separate matter. It is precisely the
point of an entitlement, however, that it concludes the question of
justice. Antilochus claims that it would be unjust to deny him the
second prize because he is entitled to it, not that he is entitled and
it would be just to give him it.
Emphasizing the idea of a right as the core of entitlement calls
13

See

PLATO, GORGIAS, lines 483-84.
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attention to an obstinate asymmetry in the notion of entitlement
itself. Although it is readily comprehensible and commonplace to
complain of injustice if one is denied a benefit to which he is entitled, it would be peculiar in the extreme to assert that someone
who incurs a penalty according to a rule is done an injustice if the
rule is not applied.1 4 One may treat that as a linguistic quirk and
insist that "analytically" entitlement extends to penalties as well
as benefits. Or one may urge that the element of a right that is
part of the notion of entitlement is not strictly attached to the element of justice but only reflects our additional interest in identifying a claimant; if there is no claimant or the potential claimant
forswears his claim, the element of justice is not eliminated abstractly but our concern for it lapses. So, one may conclude, although justice requires the application of a rule equally whether it
prescribes a benefit or a harm, in the latter case the person who
has incurred the penalty is presumed to forswear his claim.15
The asymmetry, however, lies deeper that that. For it is only
when a punitive rule is not applied that the ordinary reference to
justice (or injustice) is inapt. If a penalty is imposed according to a
rule, the imposition is explained by reference to the rule. And if
the question is pressed further, it will be asserted that it was just
to impose the penalty because the rule so provided. There is no
need for an elaborate theory of an offender's "entitlement" or
claim to be punished; it simply is just to impose the penalty as the
rule requires. Such theories, furthermore, do not overcome the
common sense of the matter that the person himself would gladly
do without the penalty. Whether one seeks artificially to incorporate penalties within the notion of entitlement or to separate entitlement as justice from entitlement as a right, the full significance
of application of a rule remains undisclosed.
14 Someone else may complain of injustice in such a case. The substance of the complaint, if it were elaborated, would refer to someone, perhaps a victim of the act to which
the penalty responds, who is "entitled" to have it imposed. Alternatively, the substance of
the complaint might be not that the rule was not applied in this case but that it had been
applied in other cases that are not relevantly dissimilar. Hegel, emphasizing that punishment responds to the aspect of wrongdoing, said that "punishment is regarded as containing
the criminal's right and hence by being punished he is honoured as a rational being." G.
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

71 (T. Knox trans. 1942).

It is tempting, if only in the interest of symmetry and conceptual tidiness, to hold
that a convicted criminal has a perfect legal right to his punishment, whether he wants
it or not, in quite the same sense as that in which a person who qualifies for an advertised reward has a right to it, whether he wants it or not. Perhaps the difference is
simply this: a renounced right ceases, sooner or later, to be a right, and the criminal's
"right" to be punished is well-nigh certain to be renounced.
J. FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 72-73; see also D. RAPHAEL, MORAL JuDGms.NrT 67-68 (1955).
25
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All that holds together the cases of application of a rule in
which justice is involved and distinguishes them from other cases
in which it is not is our attention to someone other than the person(s) applying the rule, not as an object to whom things happen
(beneficially or harmfully) but as a subject or actor who makes
things happen. 16 Entitlements are different from mere benefits because they are-so far as human arrangements are concernedwithin the power of the person entitled. One may be entitled to a
benefit that he has done nothing to earn and of which he is not
even aware, like the surprised legatee in a stranger's will. Even so,
so far as the entitlement itself is concerned, his status as an acting
subject is recognized, so that it is relevant to ask not only "Is he
pleased?" but also "Does he claim it?"
Our attention is focused similarly in cases when a rule calls for
the imposition of a penalty. If we refer to an imposition as a penalty or punishment rather than simply a harm, we recognize the
penalized person as an actor, so far as the conduct for which he
incurred the penalty is concerned. Although we may justify an imposition in other ways as well, it cannot be described as a penalty
if we deny that the person penalized did anything. So, we distinguish a fine from a tax and a sentence from conscription, although
in some circumstances the latter may be far more onerous than the
former. This recognition of the person as an actor is the core of the
suggestion that a person may be "entitled" to a penalty, which is
otherwise misleading. On the other hand, if a penalty required by a
rule is not imposed (not because of anything that the person himself has done to make the ordinary rule not apply in his case), he is
simply the recipient of a benefit, the object of an action justified
on grounds independent of his own agency. Justice, accordingly, is
not in question so far as he is concerned.
The significance of this shift of focus from the person(s) ap16 The following statement of Vlastos is closely related: "An action is just if, and only

if, it is prescribed exclusively by regard for the rights of all whom it affects substantially.
. . . Whenever the question of regard, or disregard, for substantially affected rights does not
arise, the question of justice, or injustice, does not arise." Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in
SociAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 30, 53-54. Vlastos calls this conception "equalitarian justice," id. at 55, but he evidently intends it as an explication of the idea of justice generally.
The reference to rights seems to equate justice with entitlement, which is the result of making equality the primary concern. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Elsewhere
in his article, Vlastos allows the justice of distributions according to merit. He argues both
that such distributions have a utilitarian justification because they further equalitarian values and that they further the value of liberty. Vlastos, supra, at 63-69. The arguments are
strained because of the emphasis on entitlement/equality and the secondary status given to
desert/liberty. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.

760
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plying a rule to the person(s) to whom the rule applies is perceptible in some puzzling cases that we do not ordinarily regard as raising considerations of justice. The application of, or failure to apply,
a moral principle is not generally thought to be a matter of justice
specifically, although the principle presumably functions as a rule
of conduct for other like cases. A lie, for example, may violate the
rule that one ought to tell the truth, but we should describe it as
wrong rather than as unjust. If our attention should shift from the
person telling the lie to the person to whom it is told, and if our
concern were no longer the act of the former but the availability of
the truth to the latter, it would begin to be natural and appropriate to call the lie an injustice. The ambiguity that persists arises
from a sense that the teller necessarily remains the actor in control, so that our attention cannot shift entirely to the recipient as
actor. If the former were removed entirely from consideration and
the rule in question simply provided that the latter be given certain information, the shift would be complete and justice would be
in issue. Similarly, acts are praised as displaying generosity even
though they follow a consistent pattern, like annual contributions
to a particular charity. If the pattern should become highly routine
and well-established, we might begin to think of the recipient as
having a claim to the benefaction akin to justice, although if
pressed we should acknowledge that the benefactor could end the
pattern without behaving unjustly. If the benefactor ceased altogether to be noticed and the pattern of benefactions operated, as it
were, independently (or, in a typical situation, by operation of
law), it would be natural and appropriate to think of the recipient
as having the benefit within his power and entitled justly to receive
it.

17

Although our attention to the person to or for whom a rule is
17 Although ordinary usage does not conform to a fixed pattern, it suggests some other
examples. If the application of a rule arises in a limited context that is set aside from life
generally, like a game or a contest, we are less likely to refer to justice or injustice, terms
that seem too weighty for the occasion. The calls of a referee who tilts toward the home
team--"home cooking," as it is called-will be hooted as unfair by supporters of the visitors'
team, but probably not as unjust. That imprecise distinction may reflect the fact that the
team members are identified in their limited roles as players, not fully and unqualifiedly as
actors. If the significance of the rule's application went beyond the performance of the game
itself, affecting, for example, the award of a trophy, its further consequences would more
easily be characterized as just or unjust.
Fairness is also the more natural concept when we are sure that some rule applies,
without being sure what the precise rule is. The more definite the rule, the easier it is to
refer to justice, not because the focus of our concern is necessarily in doubt when the rule is
uncertain, but because the uncertainty casts doubt on the entitlement altogether.
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applied rather than to the person applying it, more particularly to
the former as a responsible actor, locates the concern of justice as
entitlement, it does not provide a neat, formal category. There is
no reason why we should expect that it would; the aspects of a
situation that concern us are various, and our characterizations reflect our ambivalence and uncertainty. Nevertheless, it has powerful explanatory value. Entitlements are so easily identified with legal rights not because the latter are backed up with force but
because they settle the question of agency clearly and confirm the
present or past agency of the person who is entitled. Any rule that
has or is deemed to have this effect, whether or not it is enforceable, gives rise to the same claim of justice. Not only rules fixing
entitlements are taken into account but also rules imposing penalties. One understands, furthermore, why the injustice of a frustrated entitlement is resented so much more keenly than a disappointed expectation of a benefit, even if the latter is more
substantial. The refusal to honor an acknowledged entitlement is a
specific denial of the person's status as a responsible actor; it treats
him as a mere object.
There is, however, a large and important puzzle about this aspect of justice, which the preceding discussion makes more prominent. Although entitlement requires that we think of the person to
whom a rule is applied as the subject of the rule and himself an
actor, the requirement is necessarily fulfilled without regard to
anything about him as a distinct individual beyond that which satisfies the conditions for application of the rule. As we have seen, a
person who is entitled to some benefit does not have to prove, in
addition, that he has earned it, or needs it, or worked hard for it,
or will use it effectively, or anything else. It is enough that he is
entitled. Someone who has incurred a penalty does not affect the
justice of imposing it by proving that he usually behaves better, or
that he will behave better thereafter, or that its imposition will
disturb all his well-laid plans. It is enough that the penalty is prescribed. Furthermore, although the claim of justice arises from a
rule, once it has been determined that the rule is applicable, the
underlying reasons for the rule and their relevance to the particular case are of no importance. From one point of view, an entitlement or punishment directs our attention to the person to whom it
attaches; from another point of view, it prevents us from noticing
him concretely at all.
If we think of justice specifically as entitlement (including
hereafter punishment as well), the connection between law and
justice is displayed all the more forcefully. From that point of
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view, to say that the law aspires to do justice is precise. The central case of justice as entitlement describes law at its best: a known
rule, unequivocally applicable, applied when it counts. One might
also conclude, however, that the connection is vacuous. A system of
law must in some degree be a system of justice, because unless
rules are applied with regularity and consistency we cannot talk
about law at all. The justice to which law aspires, which had appeared to give it purpose and direction, turns out to be entirely
internal, a reflection of the nature of law itself and not its object at
all. One can see more plainly the attraction of legal positivism.
Legal Positivist: Do you agree that this is the rule?
Smith:

Yes, it is certainly the rule.

LP: And you agree that the rule applies to
this case?
S:

Yes.

LP: And you agree also that according to
the rule Green is entitled to the
award?
S:

There is no question about it.

LP: Then as we were saying earlier, it
would be unjust not to give the award
to Green, wouldn't it?
S:

Well... yes, I suppose so.

LP: And the just result, applying the rule,
is that Green have the award?
S: I don't see how it can be otherwise.
LP: To generalize, then, about what we
mean by entitlement, justice consists
of applying the rules as they apply.
S:

So it seems.

LP: You do not recommend, I suppose,
that we act unjustly?

S: No.
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LP: Then we are in complete agreement.
(And you may have noticed, incidentally, although I do not press the
point, that we have reached a normative conclusion from a consideration
only of the facts-what the rule is and
whether it applies.)
S: Let's back up a bit. I agree that the
rule is what you say it is. But it is not
a good rule at all and it ought to be
changed. If the rule were what it
should be, Brown would have the
award.
LP: I think so too. Isn't it too bad!
S: Doesn't that count for anything?
LP: It counts for a good deal, but not in
this discussion. A rule is a rule, after
all.
S: Yes.
LP: You are not suggesting, are you, that
when there is a rule and it is applicable, it is just not to apply it because
we believe that there ought to be a
different rule?
S: No, I don't think so.
LP: For we did agree that justice is the
application of a rule to a case to
which it applies. And if it were otherwise, an entitlement would not be
worth much at all, would it?
S: I suppose not.
LP: Well, then, there we are.
S:

I am not quite there, I am afraid. For
if agreeing that something is a rule
has that consequence, then I think I
don't agree that the rule entitles
Green to the award.
LP: Make up your mind. Does the rule
entitle Green to the award or doesn't
it?
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Well, yes, it does. That is the rule, but
it oughtn't be the rule.
LP: There is no disagreement between us
about that. It seems to me that, like it
or not, you are saying either that
justice doesn't matter or that it is not
unjust for someone to refuse to give
someone an award to which he clearly
is entitled, because you believe that
the rule ought to be something else.
And neither of those latter propositions strikes me as one many people
would accept. I know Green won't.
When the positivist asserts that "the law is the law" or that
"what the law is is one thing, whether it is a good law is another,"
he does not rely only on the facts of compliance and enforcement,
and so forth. The significance of what he asserts depends also on
the aspect of justice to which we refer as entitlement.18 It is not
enough to insist in reply that the law is bad, or even dreadful, and
ought to be changed. To meet the positivist's argument fully, one
has to respond directly to the consideration of justice.
S:

II. JUSTICE AS DESERT

The conception of justice that may be opposed to an entitlement is one that we commonly speak of as desert. Someone may
resist application of a rule, without questioning that it is the rule
and that the conditions for its application are met. He may assert
that its application would be unjust and, if asked to explain further, is likely to say that the person affected by the rule does not
deserve whatever are the consequences of its application, beneficial
or harmful. The operation of the rule may be wholly instrumental
to objectives of those who formulated it and are responsible for its
application and may not depend on the action of anyone else, in
which case no entitlement will be involved. Or there may be an
entitlement, which the claim about desert opposes. We readily

18 Although the positivist purports to describe what the law is without attaching any
necessary normative significance to it, it is only because it does have normative significance
that it is so important to distinguish what the law is from what it once was, or might be, or
even what it ought to be. There is also, of course, the element of enforcement. But most
positivists do not want to make that the distinguishing feature of law. Nor does enforcement
alone explain our correct sense that law not only obliges but obligates us-although, for
reasons discussed below, it may not obligate us conclusively.
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think of a person's desert as what ought to happen to him. That is
usually what we intend, but the two are not quite the same, for a
statement about what ought to happen is explained by a reference
to desert and does not merely repeat it. One may also admit that a
person deserves something and assert that nevertheless it ought
not happen, on some ground that is thought to be overriding in
that instance.
Although a statement about what a person deserves is complete by itself, it invites a request for explanation. If the request is
made, the response, "I don't know why, he just does," is unintelligible. Whereas an explanation of an entitlement is likely to refer
first to a rule and then to the circumstances that make it applicable, a typical explanation of desert begins with some fact about the
person's past, up to and including the present. Not any anterior
event will do; the event must be attributable to him in a certain
way, as something for which he is responsible."' Insofar as the
description of an event explains a person's desert, it will refer to
him as an actor in it, not merely as someone whom it affected.
That is true even if we attribute desert to all the members of a
group. In one way or another, each person must individually be
identified as an actor in the event that explains the group's common desert.
There is also an enlarged sense of desert, attributed not because of something that the person has done but because of who,
or what, he is. This sense is used more commonly now in connection with human beings generally to assert what all persons, as
human beings, individually deserve. So used, it is invariably something thought of as good, albeit not a reward. But it has also been
used in connection with limited groups of human beings, as, for
example, Aristotle and others, generation after generation, used it

"' Sometimes we make a statement about desert that appears not to have an explanation of this kind. For example, if John goes to bat and strikes out, I may say that he "deserves another chance," without knowing anything more about him than that he has struck
out. Another turn at bat, although something he wants, is hardly a reward for having struck
out the first time. The point being made, however, is a negative one: that, despite the general rule, John does not deserve to be out, because, for example, an airplane flew overhead
when he made the third strike. The statement denies John's responsibility in the relevant
manner and therefore denies that he deserves the usual consequence.
We may also say that a person deserves to be thanked for something for which he is not
responsible: "That enemy soldier who sneezed deserves our thanks. Otherwise we should
never have known that the enemy was almost upon us." Such usage is an extension of the
standard case, indicated by its ironic overtone. The sneezing soldier would not get far were
he to claim a medal, unless we thought it as well to give a hostage to fortune, as sometimes
we do.
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to distinguish masters from slaves.20 At the limit, it might pertain
to a single human being, and in at least one instance, the idea of
original sin, it has been used to assert that something not good is
deserved by all persons, as human beings. The explanation of desert when it is used in this enlarged sense also refers to persons as
responsible actors, but their responsibility is general and not tied
to a particular event. If some are said to be deserving in ways that
others are not, like masters and slaves, it is because only the former are thought of as responsible persons in the relevant respect.
Because the association of desert with responsibility in such cases
is general, it may be less explicit and less easily discerned than in
the standard case of individual desert arising from a specific anterior event. It will be helpful initially to confine the discussion to
the latter class of cases, keeping in mind that our conclusions must
embrace desert in the more general sense as well.
Although we are immediately aware of the connection between
responsibility and desert and use it without difficulty, the nature
of the connection is not at once so apparent. Desert, we may say,
fixes the locus of responsibility for an anterior event. Having said
that Rufus deserves to be punished for starting the fire, we do not
deny the contribution of any number of other factors: there would
have been no fire if the basement had been under water, or the
rags had not been flammable, or someone else had closed the door
in time. We affirm that, for the purpose under consideration, our
attention is fixed on Rufus. Were someone to disagree that he deserves to be punished, we should expect either an explanation that
he deserves something else-perhaps the fire was a good thing and
he deserves a reward-or, if he does not deserve anything in connection with the fire, an explanation directing our attention elsewhere: to another person, perhaps, or to circumstances for which
no person is responsible.
The responsibility fixed by desert, moreover, is not mere
causal agency, a link in a chain of causes. Although describing
something as the cause of an event also singles it out from other
contributing factors, desert attaches only to independent, self-determined responsibility, of the kind that in appropriate circumstances may correctly prompt a moral judgment. Someone might
admit that Rufus started the fire but deny that he deserves to be
punished, because "after all, he is only a child," or because "it was
all he could do to prevent an explosion," or, more vaguely, because

20 ARISTOTLE,

POLITICS, bk. 1, lines 1254a-1255b.
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"he couldn't help it." Whether punishment or reward is in question, his desert might be questioned because "he didn't mean to
start the fire" or simply because "it was an accident." Such responses do not question Rufus's causal agency, but they direct our
attention to some additional fact about him or the situation that
negates his responsibility of the kind required for desert.
Although desert is readily and most naturally associated with
moral responsibility, there are other situations in which we speak
of a person as deserving without reference to a distinctly moral
judgment. So, for example, we applaud the acrobat for his somersaults and give the best clarinetist a place in the orchestra (denying the same acknowledgment to others whose achievements are
less) without thinking about the moral qualities that were required
to develop their respective talents or thinking about their moral
characters at all. (It may be that they neglected some moral duties
in order to develop their talents.) While a person may, without being undeserving, not deserve a particular acknowledgment, we may
also, less often, think of a person who fails to achieve a standard as
undeserving in a stronger sense, almost but not quite the same as
deserving a penalty. Withholding applause from the acrobat who
repeatedly stumbles or, more familiarly, withholding a tip from a
waiter who brings the wrong orders, late, to the table may have the
aspect of an affirmative act. Even so, we may think of the acrobat
or waiter as inept without thinking him immoral.
Situations of this kind are many and various; there is no reason to reduce the nuances and ambiguities of our responses to a
few clear types. In all of them, however, like the cases in which a
moral judgment is involved, the attribution of desert indicates that
we regard the conduct in question as having had an independent
origin within the actor himself. The beautiful voice of the mechanical Olympia elicits praise for her creator, Dr. Spalanzani, not for
Olympia herself (except, of course, for poor, deluded Hoffman).2 1 If
we learned that the waiter had been drugged, we might still withhold the tip because-whatever the explanation-the service was
awful and no tip was deserved; but the waiter might have our sympathy, and the failure to tip could not be regarded as a penalty for
him at all.
A description of what a person deserves may be specific. More
often, and almost always when distinctly moral responsibility is in2 J. OFFENBACH, Ls CONIES D'HoFMANN, act 2. In Hoffmann's story, from which the

opera is derived, the admirer is NathanaeL See E. HoFFMANN, The Sandman (L. Kent & E.
Knight trans.), in TALES 277 (V. Lange ed. 1982).
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volved, it is general: praise or blame, a reward or penalty, without
further specification. But specific or general, it is always identified
as something good or bad.2 It would be peculiar in the extreme to
say of someone that, having acted this way and that, he "deserves
a great deal," without indicating whether he deserves well or ill.
When we refer to someone as a "deserving person" without more,
we do not mean that he has a tendency to deserve more frequently
than most people; the usual understanding is that he deserves well.
Thus, although in form a statement about someone's desert resembles a simple statement of fact, like the observation that he has
green eyes or has walked ten miles, it depends on premises that are
not exclusively factual. One premise (or set of premises) is factual
and describes his anterior conduct. The other is a normative judgment about the conduct; it expresses a view about how he ought to
have behaved. The conclusion is significantly different from the
premises, neither of which refers to desert at all. Nevertheless, it
follows directly and seems to be contained by, or to contain them.
Visitor Abroad
(meeting his
friend): You seem in a bad way.
Foreign Friend: Yes. I am upset. I have just learned
that a clerk in my office has done
something quite dreadful.
VA: Isn't that too bad!
FF: It was really quite immoral behavior. I
hope he gets what he deserves.
VA: Oh? Does he also deserve something?
FF: Well, I don't know what exactly he
deserves, but he certainly deserves
something.
VA: What a pity! And just when he has
done something dreadful. Why does he
deserve something?
FF: Because of what he did. There was
simply no excuse.
VA: And the rule is clear?
22 There are, perhaps, rare exceptions when we know precisely what a person deserves
without being certain how he will receive it. One might say something like, "If he did that to
someone else, let it happen to him and see how he likes it," without knowing whether he will
like it or not. Ordinarily, the assumption is that he will not.
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FF: Which rule?
VA: The one he violated.
FF: There is no precise rule. What he did
wasn't a crime or anything like that.
It was simply immoral.
VA: Then, how do you conclude that he
deserves something?
FF: But that's just it. He deserves something because he did such an immoral
thing.
VA: Do you mean that in this country
persons who behave badly deserve just
like that, even though there is no rule
fixing a penalty?
FF: Of course. Just as someone who
behaves unusually well deserves to be
praised or even rewarded for his conduct.
VA: Without any provision in advance?
FF: Certainly.
VA: How curious! It must be unsettling to
deserve all the time without any fixed
rules.
There is something radically wrong with the conversation because
we do not believe that the visitor can understand his friend's initial statement, as he appears to do, and dissent from the conclusion about desert.
Just as one of the legs on which a conclusion about desert
stands is descriptive and the other normative, desert itself seems
to be poised irresolutely between prediction and prescription. Although it is tied closely to an anterior event, it is not a prediction
about what will happen as a consequence. We know that people
often do not get what they deserve. Nor is it a prescription about
what ought to happen. A conclusion about desert is often the basis
for such a prescription, but, as we noticed above, one can, without
inconsistency, assert the former and deny the latter.
In an effort to throw a leash over the idea of desert, one might
suggest that it is no more than a curiously expressed reinforcement
of the underlying moral (or, more generally, normative) judgment,
as if to say that "What Rufus did was very bad and he deserves to
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be punished," meant, "What Rufus did was very bad. I am certain
about that and challenge you to disagree." But the leash does not
quite fit. For although they are tightly linked, the ineradicable difference between the judgment and the statement about desert remains. Desert seems to be concerned not with the validity of a
moral principle as such or the judgment that depends on it, nor
with anyone's opinion about the latter, but with something like its
effect or efficacy, as if it had an elusive grasp on reality.
That may remind us of Greek tragedy and the Greek and
Christian conceptions of the universe. If we seek help there, we
shall say not that desert stands between prediction and prescription, but that it constitutes a bridge between them. In the omniscient view, the actual is according to desert. To assert what is deserved is to assert what, in the fullness of time, will become actual.
That reminder, however, hardly clarifies. It suggests that the whole
idea of desert is a conceptual anachronism, an historical relic that
failed to get swept out with the other debris of superseded cosmologies. But we seem really to need the idea. Nothing else replaces it,
nor can its place be eliminated. Without reference to desert, one of
the fundamental
ways in which we organize our experience would
3
be lost.

2

Our firmest anchor for the idea of desert is that it fixes moral
responsibility. We may learn something more if we approach justice as desert from that direction.
III. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

The central puzzle about moral responsibility is usually formulated in terms of competing claims of free will and determinism.
As Isaiah Berlin has succinctly put it, "in a causally determined
system, the notions of free choice and moral responsibility, in their
usual senses, vanish, or at least lack application, and the notion of
action would have to be reconsidered.

24

Moral responsibility re-

s' See infra text following note 37.
24 I. BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LmERTY xxxv (1969). A.J. Ayer also makes the point
briefly and clearly.
When I am said to have done something of my own free will it is implied that I could
have acted otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have done. For a man is not
thought to be morally responsible for an action that it was not in his power to avoid.
But if human behavior is entirely governed by causal laws, it is not clear how any
action that is done could ever have been avoided. It may be said of the agent that he
would have acted otherwise if the causes of his action had been different, but they
being what they were, it seems to follow that he was bound to act as he did. Now it is
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quires the capacity to direct one's conduct oneself. 25 But a bare
capacity to choose one's actions is not enough. Although moral re-

sponsibility has to do with the quality of a person's actions, not
their consequences, morally significant freedom requires that actions have perceptible consequences.
In order for a person's unconstrained decision to count in the
way that gives rise to moral responsibility, the decision must be

made in a stable natural context. Without that, he would be like
someone who wakes up in a room where there is a board of buttons
commonly assumed both that men are capable of acting freely, in the sense that is
required to make them morally responsible, and that human behavior is entirely governed by causal laws: and it is the apparent conflict between these two assumptions
that gives rise to the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will.
A.J. AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHlmosoPmcAL ESSAYS 271, 271 (1954). Ayer finds a
solution to the problem by arguing that a causal explanation establishes nothing except an
invariable concomitance between the cause and the effect; such concomitance in the case of
human conduct, he says, does not establish that the person who engages in the conduct is
not acting freely. One may be said to act freely if he would have acted otherwise if he had
chosen to do so (and if there is no special interference with his choice, like a mental aberration or compulsion by another person). Id. at 281-82. That solution, in one form or another,
is not uncommon, e.g., J. HoSPmEs, supra note 2, at 502-07; but if the causal law holds or
some causal principle is available, it seems that he could not have chosen to act otherwise.
The problem of free will and determinism has been stated and restated countless times.
Two excellent recent discussions are B. MATs, SKEPTcAL ESSAYS 58-98 (1981), and J. LuCAs, THE FREEDOM OF THE WiL (1970). Sidgwick's brief discussion is also good. H. StaGWICK, supra note 6, at 61-72. He formulates the problem thus:

Is the self to which I refer my deliberate volitions a self of strictly determinate moral
qualities, a definite character partly inherited, partly formed by my past actions and
feelings, and by physical influences that it may have unconsciously received; so that my
voluntary action, for good or for evil, is at any moment completely caused by the determinate qualities of this character, together with my circumstances, or the external influences acting on me at the moment-including under this latter term my present
bodily conditions?--or is there always a possibility of my choosing to act in the manner
that I now judge to be reasonable and right, whatever my previous actions and experiences may have been?
Id. at 61-62.
25 See, e.g., P. VAN INWAGEN, AN ESSAY ON FRm WiL. 161-89 (1983). There are refinements and complexities of that brief generalization that can be disregarded here. For example, does moral responsibility attach if one believes mistakenly that he is directing his conduct himself? Does the puppet who is insensible of his strings merit praise or blame for his
conduct on stage? Perhaps so, if he consciously considers and chooses to conduct himself as
he does. That was the stoic solution to the problem of free will. See Long, Freedom and
Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action, in PROBLEMS INSTOIcIsM 173 (A. Long
ed. 1971). The praise or blame attaches, however, because the puppet has chosen freely. If
the choice also were determined, if there were no possibility that the puppet would choose
otherwise and wage an invisible struggle against the strings that control his movements,
then praise and blame are out of the picture whether or not he thinks so. That, of course, is
just our own situation according to the complete determinist. Perhaps we can distinguish
ourselves from the puppet on the basis that in our case there is no one offstage watching the
puppet and puppetmaster both. Still, it would be odd if our own description of our situation
were to be altered by the imperceptible presence of an observer.
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to push and no indication of which button does what. He pushes a
button at random, and outside the window a building blows up. He
pushes another button and lilacs bloom on the flagpole. But when
he pushes the second button again, the flagpole vanishes, leaving
only the lilacs blooming in midair. Hard as he tries to discover a
pattern, he cannot. He has a certain kind of freedom; it is up to
him alone to decide which buttons to push, or whether to push
any. But it is freedom in a funhouse, a nightmare in which nothing
that one does can be depended on.26 Having stumbled on a benign
situation outside the window, he resolves not to push any more
buttons; but then
the situation begins to change whether he pushes
27
them or not.

In such a world, one could not even conclude safely that he
will "do the right thing," whatever the consequences.2 s For if he
gives a dollar to a beggar, it blows up in the beggar's hand, and
when he steps back to let an elderly person board the bus, the bus
vanishes and the person falls into the gutter. It has been pointed
out often that a wholly "free" will, altogether undetermined by a
person's past, contradicts moral responsibility because decisions
would not then be that person's in the relevant sense.2 9 A wholly
26 Gilbert's depiction in the Lord Chancellor's Nightmare Song from Iolanthe is in

point-and in rhyme.
2If
pushing the buttons lost all connection with events outside the window, then it is
hard to imagine how our concepts of freedom and moral responsibility could arise for him at
all unless his actions had predictable consequences within his isolated chamber or he had
acquired the concepts before he entered it. Likewise, the concept of an action would be
reduced to his own bodily movements and sensations. Within that reduced range, there
would be room for a severely restricted idea of freedom. He might, at any rate, distinguish
between an ache in his finger from pushing too many buttons and a sore throat that just
happened.
" The idea of "consequences" of an action would, of course, be problematic along with
the idea of an action itself. On what basis could one assert that a random occurrence was the
consequence of something that one had done? If one did make such an assertion, where
could one stop?
19 E.g., A.J. AyaR, supra note 24, at 275:
[I]f it is a matter of pure chance that a man should act in one way rather than another,
he may be free but he can hardly be responsible. And indeed when a man's actions
seem to us quite unpredictable, when, as we say, there is no knowing what he will do,
we do not look upon him as a moral agent. We look upon him rather as a lunatic....
... Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not. If it is an
accident, then it is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise; and if it
is merely a matter of chance that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely irrational to
hold me morally responsible for choosing as I did. But if it is not an accident that I
choose to do one thing rather than another, then presumably there is some causal explanation of my choice: and in that case we are led back to determinism.
See J. LucAs, supra note 24, at 56-61; Campbell, Is 'Freewill' a Pseudo-Problem?,60 MIND
441, 459-62 (1951).
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indeterminate universe in which to exercise one's will also contradicts moral responsibility because there would be nothing for
which a person's "decision" made him responsible at all. The direction of one's conduct, on which moral responsibility depends,
requires both freedom to choose one's actions and a sufficiently
stable, causally determinate background order to make one's
choices count. Desert, then, arising from moral responsibility, also
requires both.
Desert, however, takes us beyond the idea of a stable causal
order to the idea of a normative order in which people are roughly
situated as they deserve and get roughly what they deserve. Just as
individual freedom to choose would attain no hold in a world without causal order, because choice would be meaningless, so our judgments about individual desert would be empty in a world devoid of
natural justice. At stake are not merely the occasional bursts of
good or bad fortune that we label explicitly as "luck," but the
whole constitution of our individual selves, the talents, attributes
of character, and all the other qualities that make each of us the
person he is and not another, as well as all the circumstances of
our individual lives. The large and small conclusions about desert
that implicitly or explicitly accompany moral judgment would be
as grains of sand on a beach if a person's entire situation independent of any action that would support a moral judgment were altogether indifferent to desert. Individual desert arising from the exercise of moral freedom requires a normatively ordered
background, lest the desert that one earns be swamped by undeserved conditions and circumstances. Even one's desert, insofar as
it is a reflection of one's individual character, seems to depend on
how one is constituted. Short of us all being identical, which also
would eliminate considerations of desert, either the differences
among us must not matter or they must be due and. satisfy the
conditions of justice.
A visitor to the kingdom of Kmet was taken after his arrival to the Great Square. "Here you will observe our most
important practice, central to every aspect of Kmetan life,"
his escort told him. One after another, Kmetans approached
the Great Urn, situated in the center of the Square and shining brilliantly. The Urn pronounced a judgment on each of
them in turn. The judgment invariably consisted of the announcement of some award or fine, usually a moderate
amount but occasionally a great deal. After being judged, the
Kmetan turned to the left where there was a desk.
There the judgment of the Great Urn was recorded, and
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the Kmetan received his award or paid his fine. The procession up to the Great Urn and then to the desk was solemn
and stately. It was evident that the Kmetans took it most
seriously. "Our children are instructed from their earliest
days in the path of the Great Urn," the escort observed. "We
should regard someone who had no appreciationof the path
as crazed, almost not fully human."
"Does everyone come here?" the visitor asked.
"Without exception."
"It is certainly very impressive," said the visitor.
After they had observed for a long while, the escort suggested that they leave. The visitor had noticed that, before
approaching the Great Urn, the Kmetans entered an enclosure on the north side of the Square. Nothing could be seen
inside the enclosure, but a great many noises were audible,
among which the visitor heard voices expressing joy or sorrow in the most extreme terms.
"Might I have a look inside the enclosure?" the visitor
asked.
"There is nothing to stop you, but it is of no importance
at all. We Kmetans scarcely notice it."
Admitting that he was curious, the visitor entered the
enclosure. Inside, there was a disorderly line of persons. One
by one, in no particularorder and without paying much attention, they approached an urn that was like the Great Urn
in all respects except that it was of some dull finish. This
urn also pronounced a judgment on each person. The only
difference that the visitor could see was that its judgments
were usually for much larger awards or fines than the ones
outside; often, indeed, they were cataclysmic. Invariably,the
person received the award or paid the fine before leaving the
enclosure and approaching the Great Urn.
The visitor returned to his escort. "Is there any connection between the judgments of the two urns?" he asked.
"Not really. There is this. Often the judgment pronounced within the enclosure has a significant, one might almost say controlling, effect on the judgment pronounced by
the Great Urn later."
"You mean an award within the enclosure makes it more
likely that one will be given an award by the Great Urn?"
"Evidently. And the same with fines."
"All in all, judgments within the enclosure are what really count, I suppose."
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"We do not think of it that way. The judgments of the
Great Urn are what concern us. One might say that most of
one's life depends on the judgments within the enclosure, but
that is of minor importance."
The visitor inquired for a long time about other differences between the judgments of the two urns that would explain their relative importance to the Kmetans. He was
never able to discover any.
Insofar as our judgments about individual desert disregard the
background order against which they are made, we resemble the
citizens of Kmet. Like what happens within the enclosure, the circumstances that explain how a person got to be the (un)deserving
person that he is seem to be "what really counts."
The usual way out is to say, like the Kmetan, "We do not
think of it that way." Our attributions of desert, it is argued, simply are more limited than that; they have to do with those actions
for which a person is responsible, and do not look beyond the action itself to determine whether the person deserved to be the kind
of person he is, in the situation in which he found himself. Robert
Nozick, for example, asserts that we can correctly "describe people
as entitled to their natural assets even if it's not the case that they
can be said to deserve them.. . . Whether or not people's natural
assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to
them, and to what flows from them."80 Were we to require that a
person's desert be deserved "all the way down," we should render
the very idea of desert incoherent, because desert depends on conduct and we should always be able to ask whether the person "deserved" to engage in the conduct in which he engaged.81 To put it
another way, if every one of a person's qualities had itself to be
deserved, the idea of a person as the subject of desert would lose
meaning.
However, we do not eliminate the problem by agreeing that it
is very difficult and deciding not to talk about it. Nozick's reference to an entitlement to an undeserved natural asset, for example,
is only a dressed-up version of the Kmetan's dismissal of the problem, not a solution to it. What could such a natural "entitlement"
possibly be? On what could it be based? It is easy to overlook the
problem in the form in which Nozick presents it, because he draws
our attention to talents rather than to moral character. When we

30

R. NozicK, ANARCHy, STATE,

S

The phrase is Nozick's. Id. at 225. See M.

AND UTOPIA

225-26 (1974) (footnote omitted).
SANDaL,

supra note 5, at 83-84.
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speak of a person as deserving because of his talent, the normative
aspect of his desert is not immediately as evident as it is when
moral desert is in question; nor does a judgment that a person is
talented necessarily implicate a judgment about his desert, as does
a moral judgment. Nevertheless, it is only the normative aspect of
the statement that he is deserving that distinguishes it from a
description, however laudatory, of his talent. The insistent connection of individual moral responsibility with desert does seem to
take us all the way down, even if perforce we usually manage to
32
stop somewhere short of the bottom.
If we examine the connection between moral responsibility
and desert, we arrive at this dilemma. On one hand, the two seem
to be distinct but inseparable aspects of the same idea. As soon as
we have stated premises that will support a conclusion about moral
responsibility, we have committed ourselves also to a conclusion
about desert. Yet, the latter conclusion cannot be maintained unless we suppose, contrary to our actual experience, that we have
our individual "just deserts" prior to and independent of the exercise of moral responsibility. The ordinary notion of moral responsibility that we apply without difficulty in every aspect of our lives,
whenever we think about human beings as responsible persons,
seems to commit us to the altogether unacceptable proposition
that "whatever is, is right."3 3
The dilemma is not abstract or remote. Once made explicit, it
dominates public and private moral issues of every kind. For example, a young man who has been caught mugging someone for the
third time is convicted and brought before a court to be sentenced.
He (not being a Kmetan) asks leave to speak. He tells the judge
that he was born with little natural endowment: physically weak,
intellectually limited, unhandsome. He was ill-nurtured; neither of
his parents, who were themselves criminals in their youth, took an
interest in his welfare. He was not taught a satisfactory trade, nor
was moral or lawful behavior much encouraged in his neighborhood. He never asked for any of that and in no sense can he be
said to have deserved it. The judge points out that many other

32

[I]t does not seem possible to separate in practice that part of a man's achievement

which is due strictly to his free choice from that part which is due to the original gift of
nature and to favouring circumstances: so that we must necessarily leave to providence
the realisation of what we conceive as the theoretical ideal of Justice, and content ourselves with trying to reward voluntary actions in proportion to the worth of the services
intentionally rendered by them.
H. SEDGwicK, supra note 6, at 285 (footnote omitted).
A. POPE, ESSAY ON MAN,epistle IV, line 394.
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persons confronted difficult circumstances and did not become
criminals. The young man responds that a lot more of them did
than those who were raised more happily. It is, he asserts, irrational and the worst sort of hypocrisy to speak now of his desert,
when the whole unfortunate course of his life was undeserved and
had a significant, if not controlling, effect on his conduct that is
now in question. (A lawyer assigned to assist him adds that insofar
as his past did not have a controlling effect on his conduct, the
young man can hardly be held accountable for it, since heaven only
knows what produced it.)
The same argument touches the small incidents that compose
the morality of most lives as much as it touches the dramatic examples of moral heroism and failure that call forth explicit pronouncements about desert. Not only does what a person deserves
seem trivial in comparison with those aspects of life, including natural endowments, that happen to us without any connection to our
desert. Even in that small corner of our lives where moral responsibility is relevant, desert really counts for nothing, since our conduct is so much affected, for better or worse, by its undeserved
antecedents.
IV. THE UTImrrARLN RESPONSE
The preceding argument presses us to the conclusion that, unless we can accept the assumption of "natural justice" we must
break the connection between moral responsibility and desert in
order to preserve the idea of moral responsibility itself. Why
should we not, after all, explicitly limit the notion of moral responsibility to the moral principles themselves and the fact that someone did or did not observe them, without any implication about his
desert?3 4 We could still express our views about conduct generally
and in specific cases. The young man who has a propensity for
mugging, for example, might be told: "It is immoral to take another person's property without right and by force. You ought not
to do it. You are not sentenced to prison because you deserve to be
punished. We know and care nothing about that. You are sentenced because we want to prevent conduct like yours, and the
sentence, we believe, will have that effect."
That approach to moral judgment adopts a strictly utilitarian
attitude to matters of desert. Praise and blame, rewards and penal" That presumes, of course, that the idea of morality itself can be sustained without
the idea of desert, which I argue below cannot be done.
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ties, are appropriate only insofar as they affect future behavior.
Desert as a strictly moral phenomenon has no meaning or reference, but we may continue to speak as though it did, because it is
an effective way to induce the right behavior. The idea of punishment, for example, moralizes the sentiment of retaliation and reinforces moral principles against the desire for individual advantage.
However, should it occur somehow that rewarding Smith for an
immoral act will have more beneficial consequences than punishing
him, then Smith should be rewarded. And if punishing Jones for
Smith's act will have beneficial consequences, then Jones may be
punished.3 5 So far as nonmoral desert is concerned, it is only an
efficient and useful way to distribute goods; those who are talented
are encouraged to exercise their talents and those who are not are
encouraged not to resent their relative deprivation. If there is a
puzzle about desert, it concerns only the origin and strength of the
sense of desert, which is a psychological matter without philosophical significance.
This reduction of desert to utility, which treats desert not as a
self-sufficient end but as a means to another end, has more than a
little support in our actual practices. Rarely is there a situation in
which we respond according to notions of desert when our response
does not plausibly further any other social objective. If another social objective strongly so requires, we pass over contrary considerations of desert silently or with only the merest pretense that justice
is served. For example, persons who are pathologically unable to
refrain from harmful conduct, the criminally insane and sexual
psychopaths, are "committed" to "hospitals" for "treatment"; the
labels scarcely obscure the fact that the commitment is a sentence
to a prison-like institution without facilities for any serious treatment at all. We noticed above that although desert is a sufficient
ground for action, it can be overridden in special circumstances.
Pressing public or private interests regularly oblige us to dispense
with desert, good or bad, lest too much else be sacrificed. If we
treat desert itself as based on utilitarian considerations, it may be
argued, we do no more than acknowledge frankly that the "special"
cases are not special at all and that the reasoning we apply to them
applies generally.
" There may seem to be an inconsistency in the notion of an undeserved reward or an
undeservedpunishment, because the terms "reward" and "punishment" contain an implication of desert. One can, however, consistently assert that someone ought to receive what
ordinarily would be a reward or punishment, although he does not deserve it. See H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RasPoNsmLrrY 4-6 (1968).
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Such an argument is typically presented as part of a more general utilitarian ethics. John Stuart Mill, for example, said that
principles of justice are those "moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of
more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of
life.""8 Justice as desert, then, both in individual cases and in the
enlarged sense by which it attaches to all human beings or to a
group, falls within that general description. But the reduction of
desert in particular to social utility need not be derived from a
more general utilitarian theory. Whatever is the basis of one's
moral principles generally, desert might be recognized only as a
means to their realization. So far as desert alone is concerned, the
complexities and perplexities of calculating relative totals of well37
being can be avoided.
For all the utilitarian's calm argument, his analysis of desert
does not provide an accurate account of what we mean by it. The
utilitarian rests his conclusions on actual consequences. Individual
responsibility is relevant insofar as it has a bearing on the outcome
for the community generally of one policy or another. Desert, however, focuses our attention differently from the beginning. It depends on a person's responsible relation to his conduct and is insistently individual rather than general. To ask what the consequence
will be in order to determine what a person deserves is not a practical or moral error so much as a failure to understand what desert
is all about.
The utilitarian understands this abstract difference between
utility and desert, but believes that in practice it has no substance.
In general, when desert appears to be a strong independent consideration, it is also consistent with sound social policy; the community is likely to be dependent on responsible individual action,
which considerations of desert will foster, to carry its policies into
effect. When desert and utility appear to diverge, our actual practices show that we do not keep them separate. In the unusual case
when justice prevails against social policy, we have, the utilitarian
argues, simply made a mistake, which is understandable in view of
the rarity of such cases, the difficulty of the issue, and the usual

36

J.S. MILL, UTmrrIuSM 88-89 (15th ed. 1907) (1st ed. London 1863).

Such an effort requires one to adopt a general ethical theory at the outset, since one
has to know what desert is supposed to be useful for. Almost always, or perhaps simply
always, the effort is in fact made in the context of a general utilitarian theory, which adopts
"general well-being" as the ultimate moral standard. The effort to deal with desert, therefore, does get mixed up with the "felicific calculus" and all its difficulties.
37
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utility of adherence to justice.
Some of the efforts to show how desert and utility coincide are
notoriously unconvincing. Too often, the demonstration seems calculated to show the utility of a result that we know to be correct
on other grounds. The utilitarian may concede as much, only observing that the issues are large and complex. In the end, he will
assert that however weak some of his factual demonstrations may
be, desert cannot mean anything but utility because there is nothing else for it to mean. His opponents also finally disregard the
demonstrations themselves, strong or weak. They will assert that
the reduction of desert to utility is wrong not because of the answer it gives to a question whether punishment of an innocent person, indefinite commitment of the mentally ill, or even forced labor
or slavery may not be deserved, but because it allows, indeed requires, us to ask the question at all.38 To ask whether some human
lives ought not be destroyed for the sake of the rest or for any
reason, without asking independently whether it would be just, is,
they assert, wrong. The utilitarian's final response is a challenge:
Either accept my analysis of desert as utility or grant that it is
without any content whatever. Either way, the outcome is the
same.
V.

DESERT AND

MORAL

RESPONSIBILITY

The reduction of desert to utility has great force. Particular
arguments to show how desert is useful may stretch our credulity.
But that is nothing compared with the suspension of disbelief that
is demanded by the notion of natural justice. If individual desert
depends on a general background order of desert, then have we
really an alternative to the utilitarian account? On the other hand,
one may ask also whether we have an alternative to the idea of
desert, with all that it implies about natural justice.
We noticed above that the ideas of moral responsibility and
desert contain one another. Just as desert depends on moral responsibility, so too moral responsibility leads directly to a conclusion about desert and cannot be sustained without it. The connection can be broken in speech and can be ignored or overridden
sometimes in practice. But it cannot be broken conceptually without depriving our moral judgments of their specifically moral quality. A judgment that a person ought or ought not to have behaved
as he did that carried no implication about desert would be akin to
" See Rawls. Justice as Fairness.67 PHm. REv. 164. 188-90 (1958).
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an observation that a machine ought to have produced so many
widgets per hour. Its full significance would be reflected in a search
for causes to make the person do what he ought. So, for example,
when the utilitarian judge pronounces sentence against the young
man, all that counts is what sentence will achieve the desired result in the future. But to treat a person's conduct as fully determined by causes external to himself, whether the causes are natural or deliberately engineered, is to deny him the freedom without
which one is not a moral being.
To speak of a category of human beings or of human beings
generally as deserving in some respect is to assert that they are
responsible in that area of their lives. Women deserve a right to
vote as men do because they are as capable as men of electing their
governors and are not to be treated merely as civil subjects, morally irresponsible for the laws that they are obliged to obey. All
persons deserve an equal opportunity for employment because all
are equally capable of exercising a choice, even though they are not
equally capable of implementing it; they are not to be treated as
machines, not responsible for their employment and set to do
whatever tasks it is useful to have done. Slavery is wrong not because it necessarily lacks utility; if the highest morality requires a
pyramid for one's god, it may be useful to find slaves to build it. It
is wrong because it denies altogether the freedom and moral stature of the slaves, who are deemed fit for whatever function their
masters assign them.
Moral responsibility and desert are inseparable because we
have only the two ways of ordering our experience, freedom and
cause, each of which excludes the other. As soon as one is eliminated, the other occupies the field; we strive for explanation and
do not accept a vacuum of order altogether. To eliminate desert as
the basis for responding to conduct is explicitly to put the response
and the conduct itself within the realm of causation.
The reduction of desert to utility generally adopts as a principle and a program the submission of human action to causal order.3 9 Desert marks the limits of such an approach. It identifies
responsibility explicitly as moral responsibility by placing an act in
the realm of freedom. We may say that by admitting cause as a full
30 This may sound strange and inhospitable to someone like John Stuart Mill, who was
both a utilitarian and a defender of liberty. Contemporary philosophers, among whom
H.L.A. Hart is notable, have taken a like position. One may, however, believe that liberty is
valuable because it promotes well-being without believing that the exercise of liberty is an
exercise of morally significant freedom. See infra text following note 60.
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account of our actions (or by treating our actions as if cause fully

accounts for them) the denial of desert is a denial of the relevance
of freedom. Or we may say that the denial of desert is a denial of
the relevance of freedom, which thereby admits cause as a full
account.
The link between desert and freedom is fundamental and irreducible. It is as fruitless to ask why desert should be the expression
of freedom as it is to ask why causation should be the mode or
expression of regularity and stability. We may decide that, so far
as we are able, persons will or will not get what they deserve. But
so long as we think of them as persons, who act with freedom and
moral responsibility, we cannot decide that they will not deserve.
They just do.
We do not need to address the question whether a universe
40
containing persons is imaginable without the idea of desert. It
may be, although it lies beyond our capacity to settle the conjecture, that desert is a conceptual anachronism, which rose and
should have fallen with the belief that desert is always realized in
the fullness of time. So far as we can tell-and it is sufficient for
the present purpose-the moral ordering of our experience includes irreducibly and a priori the element of desert, which itself is
incoherent without the presupposition in some form that all
human experience, both that which involves free will and that
which is causally ordered independently of human will, is responsive to considerations of desert. We may acknowledge that we do
not and cannot know the bases of natural desert. One might have
thought that unavoidable ignorance of that kind would defeat the
notion altogether. Evidently that is not so.
VI. ENTITLEMENT AND DESERT

We are now able to see how entitlement and desert are united
in the complete idea of justice. If an entitlement is also deserved,
the claim of justice is at its strongest and ordinary usage allows us
to employ the two terms interchangeably, according to which aspect of the claim we want to emphasize. So, since Antilochus came
Cf. B. BARRY,supra note 4, at 109-15. Barry states that desert is "a concept which is
already in decline and may eventually disappear," id. at 112, and that "a world in which

'desert' had completely disappeared would not necessarily be radically different from one
with it," id. at 114. It is evident that I agree with neither proposition. Barry's argument
suggests that he may have in mind only a shift away from individual desert toward utilitarian considerations as a ground of legal entitlements. He does not draw out the ontological
implications of the complete abandonment of desert.
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in second in the chariot race because of his own effort (or so it
appeared), we may conclude that he not only is entitled to the
prize according to the rules but also deserves it;4 amd our conclusion will move easily between the two considerations. If a deserved
entitlement is the creation of law, we may take the element of desert for granted and equate application of the law with justice; so
doing, we overlook the other sense of justice in which the equation
is vacuous, as if the entitlement alone answered the question
whether the law ought to be applied. On the other hand, if considerations of desert are clear and compelling and the situation is explicitly within a framework of rules, we may strain the rules to find
an entitlement that coincides with desert. That occurs most commonly and visibly in the law, where the significance of entitlement
is especially great; even if the separate significance of desert is acknowledged, as often it is not, the result is inevitably cast as an
entitlement. So, according to the adage, hard cases make bad law.
Entitlement and desert need not coincide, however. A person
may be entitled to something that he does not deserve, like the
ne'er-do-well heir, or he may deserve something to which he is not
entitled, like the poor relation who cares long and faithfully for the
dying testator and is not mentioned in his will. In such a case, we
must somehow decide which to prefer. So, in the law, if justice as
entitlement prevails, we may dismiss contrary considerations of desert with the observation that the law is settled and clear. So also,
in the rare legal cases when it is urged explicitly that desert should
prevail over entitlement, the former is likely to be referred to a
"higher law," as a sort of small acknowledgment of entitlement after all.42
Differences between entitlement and desert arise because, although both call attention to a person as a responsible actor, the
former depends entirely on application of a rule and the latter
arises exclusively from moral responsibility. While the rule may be
supposed to apply according to desert, circumstances may not
work out as we had supposed they would, or the rule may not be
designed to apply according to desert at all. Where a community
adopts the goal of justice as desert in its public life-and even as a
See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
Compare Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (limiting the protections of
procedural due process to entitlements as opposed to claims, however serious and substantial, on altogether nonlegal grounds), with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (an earlier
case in which the availability of procedural due process seemed to depend in part on the
claimants' need, a matter of nonlegal desert). See generally Michelman, Formaland Associational Aims in ProceduralDue Process, 18 Nomos 126 (1977).
4

42
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goal, it will be subject to exceptions-in private life, goals other
than justice are pursued constantly and without reproach. The
claims of love, friendship, family, commitment, as well as the ordinary, unsystematic pursuit of private satisfactions are all admitted
as worth-while. An effort to make justice the exclusive consideration would lead to the elimination of such private goals altogether, as in Plato's vision of the ideal community.41
In a society that preserves large areas of life for private arrangements, which are supported by law, voluntary transfers of
every kind create entitlements based not on the recipient's desert
but simply on the transfer. The claim of the original transferor
may have been based on desert, but intervening links in the chain
may make that claim remote from a current entitlement; the ne'erdo-well heir may be removed by generations of ne'er-do-well heirs
from the deserving ancestor and likely as not does not even know
his name. In any case, desert is insistently individual. Whether
there are many links in the chain or few, inherited or transferred
desert is as meaningless in this context as it is in the context of the
inherited guilt of the family of Oedipus. If the appalling doom of
Oedipus and his children, said to be the consequence of his father's
wrongful act, was undeserved, the meagre entitlement of the child
of poor parents likewise has nothing to do with his desert (and
may have nothing to do with his parents' desert either).
Even when the substance of an entitlement seems consistent
with desert, the former typically has a specificity that the latter
lacks. An indefinite entitlement calls for further articulation of the
rule on which it depends; rules lend themselves to such articulation and, if the result is accepted, may be said implicitly to have
contained it. Desert, on the other hand, is not often put to the test
of specificity and even resists it." Not fixed in advance by a rule, it
may take into account an unlimited range of circumstances. The
lex talionis, eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth, has nothing to
recommend it as a measure of desert. It attracts us nonetheless,
because its insistence on symmetry between an act and the de4' See

PLATO, supra note 1, bks. 2-8.
44 In a case like the chariot race, desert may seem to be specific, because it is coupled

with an entitlement or, perhaps, a quasi-entitlement. We know what Antiochus deserves
because he deservedly (as it appears) is entitled to the second prize. In competitive situations generally, one may deserve one's rank, which entitled one to a specific award. In noncompetitive situations, one may be deserving because of one's talents, but, unless some sort
of rule is applicable, there is no basis for saying what one deserves specifically. The excellent
waiter may deserve a tip, but not a specific amount, as our resort to a rule of thumb (15%)
to overcome our indecision attests.
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served response relieves us of the burden of considering every particularity in the circumstances that might have a bearing on the
45
actor's desert.
We are familiar with the idea of an unjust law. That possibility is what has led to the view that justice fully considered is simply desert and that "legal justice," or entitlement, is a partial justice or a formal and somewhat suspect imitation of the real thing.
But desert without entitlement is also an inadequate conception of
justice. Unless we believe that the conduct giving rise to desert is
based on qualities of the deserving person that are properly his,
that is to say to which he is entitled, we do not speak of desert at
all. If we reject an entitlement as inconsistent with desert, we do
not thereby affirm justice as desert alone, removed from entitlement altogether; we affirm it as desert according to another
entitlement.
At the stroke of midnite, the mysterious beauty fled from
the royal palace. On the staircase,one of her glass slippers
fell off. The prince, chasing after her, picked up the slipper.
Everyone wondered who the woman could have been. The
prince wondered most of all. He announced that his messengers would search the kingdom. The woman whose foot fit
into the glass slipper would be his bride.
When the messenger arrived at the house where Cinderella lived with her stepmother and her two stepsisters, the
older of the stepsisters was there to meet him. She was somewhat double-jointed and had practicedbending her toes back
under her foot for weeks. The messenger was dubious. But
with her toes tucked back, she got her foot-more or
less-into the slipper. "Call me princess," she said.
Looking into her face, the messenger was still dubious.
But the stepsister's foot, getting redder by the minute, was

"Kant, who was unwavering in his insistence that precise justice-as desert-be done,
tied his argument in intricate knots when he tried to give examples of it. He relied, inevitably, on the "lex talionis" equally inevitably, he was both imaginative and conventional in
his renderings of it. See I.KANT,Tim METAPHYsxcAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100-07 (J. Ladd
trans. 1965).
The hopelessness of rendering a precise judgment according to desert regularly confronts judges in criminal cases. The law brings the sentence within a broad range that may
encompass years of imprisonment, as a matter of entitlement; within that range, the judge
has to decide according to the circumstances of the crime and the criminal. Understandably,
judges take comfort in the realization that their sentences also are imprecise and that the
actual penalty will be determined afterwards by prison authorities and parole boards (who
usually rely on rough rules of thumb).
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still in the slipper. "The prince didn't say you could bend
your toes back that way," he said.
"He didn't say you couldn't," the stepsister replied.
"Call me princess."
Just then, Cinderella'sfairy godmother appeared. "Try
Cinderella," she said to the messenger. She prodded Cinderella to come out from the chimney. The messenger was more
dubious than before. "Everyone gets a chance," the fairy godmother said.
With some effort, the slipper was pried off the stepsister's foot. The fairy godmother dipped her wand. Cinderella
slid her foot easily into the slipper, and-anotherdip of the
wand-she was dressed as she had been at the ball. "There,"
the fairy godmother said, "there is the woman who deserves
the prince."
"There she is indeed," the messenger said.
"Nuts to that," the stepsister said. "Why does she deserve the prince more than me?"
("More than I," the fairy godmother murmured.)
"Well," the messenger said, "she is beautiful and kind
and gentle and she dances like Fred Astaire, and she has a
beautiful wardrobe. Who could deserve a prince more?"
"Anyone could," the stepsister replied. "I see it all. Cinderella's always been a drudge. A snivelling, drippy-nosed,
sooty drudge. Never did anything to make something of herself. Why, every time there was a dance, my sister and I
asked her to go with us. I offered to lend her my best dress.
She always said no. Always sitting there playing with a rotten pumpkin and a couple of verminous little mice. Ugh!
Then this fairy god-what's-her-name comes along and,
poof-Cinderella'sa princess. Never did a thing to deserve it.
All these years I've been trying to make something of myself.
So what if I'm not terrific. I make the best of what I've got.
Why doesn't what's-her-name do her wand number on me?
Cinderella doesn't deserve to marry the prince any more
than that pumpkin does."
Cinderella smiled gently and walked off on the arm of
the messenger.
The stepsister brought a lawsuit in which the prince was
named as defendant. Her main claim was that the prince's
originalannouncement should be interpretedto provide that
only a person's natural attributes count; and that Cinderella's naturalslipper size was 11 . The prince's defense was
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that when he made the announcement, all he cared about
was that the woman he marry be the woman in the glass slipper with whom he had danced at the ball. Cinderella was
that woman, and it was all the same to him how she got to be
who she was. Cinderella'sfairy godmother was lead counsel
for the defense, and the prince won the case.
If our sympathies were not with Cinderella from the start, we
should have to say that her stepsister had a strong argument.
From the perspective of complete justice, an unqualified statement that someone is entitled to win an award excludes the possibility that someone else deserves it; for if someone else were deserving, the rule on which the former person's entitlement depends
would not be valid. Likewise, an unqualified statement that someone deserves an award excludes the possibility that a valid rule
entitles someone else to it; for if there were such a rule, the former
person would not deserve it.
Entitlements have the same relation to desert as do natural
occurrences, which also may, but need not, conform to desert."6
Rules that create entitlements intervene in the natural course of
events; they are a substitute for and displace the laws of nature.
We are apt not to notice this relation between them, because rules
are deliberately adapted toward some objective, while the laws of
nature simply describe patterns of natural phenomena. Rules are
broken by nonconforming behavior; natural laws are not broken
but falsified. With respect to a person's individual desert, it does
not matter whether the differential characteristics that make him
the person that he is and more or less deserving than other person(s) are based on legal or other entitlements or on the distribution of nature. In either case, they simply come.
The complete idea of justice, in which both entitlement and
desert are present, is thus the analogue of natural moral order. We
saw in section III above that the idea of desert supposes a background for one's actions that is orderly not only causally but morally as well; a person's individual situation must be roughly as he
deserves. That is no less true in the portion of our experience determined not by causal laws of nature but by the positive law (and
other rules) of the community. However the background order is
composed, individual desert and moral responsibility suppose that
4" For some reason, when a natural occurrence conforms very closely to what we think
is deserved, we call it "poetic justice." That probably gives the creative power of poetry

more than its due, but it may suggest our perplexity about, and perhaps our exasperation
with, the whole business.
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what happens to a person is-somehow-according to desert and
that what a person deserves-somehow-becomes actual.
It is evidently easier for us to suppose that justice is realizable
in human affairs than to believe that there is a natural moral order. At least it is easier for us to overlook the fact that justice is
not realizable. Perhaps all that it is necessary to say is that we
adopt the idea of justice as a standard for ourselves without depending on a model in nature. But the former is unattainable not
only because human beings are weak but because the idea itself is
antinomic. A natural moral order, in which everyone gets what he
deserves, excludes the possibility of significant self-determined action and thereby eliminates the possibility of desert altogether. All
being always and everywhere exactly what is just, there could be
no possibility of significant human freedom, which would be a disruptive wild card.41 In the only terms in which we could describe
such an inevitable, perfectly ordered course of nature, cause would
displace freedom entirely. Complete justice within a human community would be the same. If positive law-entitlement-perfectly
embodied desert, it would authorize only that action that was consistent with desert and would exclude the possibility of a lawful
self-determined action. The dying testator would no longer be able
to choose his heir; the faithful, industrious relation-who is a bit of
a pill nonetheless-would inherit because he is deserving, and the
ne'er-do-well whom the testator loves despite it all would reap no
more than he had sown. Insofar as the law were effective, the possibility of desert would be eliminated, because the rule of law
would determine all our actions.
On the other hand, every departure from a situation perfectly
according to desert, whether it is natural or provided by law, undermines our judgments about desert based on the exercise of freedom. The problem is most visible in extreme cases-someone born
with a substantial natural handicap or with unusual talents, or
born into an impoverished environment or an unusually well-endowed one. But it infects every case in which people are situated
differently. According to the general assumption that the universe
is orderly, individual desert in each case will vary precisely as

47 Compare the epicurean doctrine that the universe is governed strictly according to

causal laws that determine atomic motion, but that this motion is occasionally interrupted
by a "swerve," or absolutely undetermined motion, of some atoms. This arbitrary indeterminism accounted for free will as well as the beginning of the causal chain. See A. LONG,
HELumLsNmTC PHELOSOPHY 37-38, 56-61 (1974).
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much as it is undermined. 8
VII. LIBERTY AND EQUALITY

If we confine our attention to that portion of our lives within
the ambit of positive law, in which entitlements displace natural
occurrences, the conclusions of the previous section can be taken a
step further. The ideas of liberty and equality are prominent as
organizing principles in contemporary political philosophy. In John
Rawls's influential work, for example, the two basic principles of
justice, which determine "the basic structure of society," are specific principles of liberty and equality.4" Other writers as well, implicitly or explicitly, have suggested that a description of the con" John Rawls's theory of justice obscures the antinomy. His starting point is a conception of free and equal moral persons. It is that conception that dictates disregard (ignorance) of individual circumstances in the original position; persons are represented as not
"affected by social fortune and natural accident." Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral
Theory, 77 J. PHm. 515, 523 (1980). See also id. at 529. The fundamental principles of
justice are those principles that persons free and equal in that sense would adopt to deal
with all the differences of nature and fortune that make one person more or less able than
another, the critical consideration being that none of the differences is itself a matter of
justice, i.e., deserved. The general formula is to provide conditions of social order that maximize the realization of individual interests, always on the basis that the more able have no
special claim because of their (undeserved) ability; if they are allowed extra rewards according to distributional principles that Rawls specifies, it is because that will contribute to the
maximum realization of the interests of the whole group. Since every consideration of individual desert is rejected as a basis for the fundamental principles of justice, the outcome has
strong utilitarian aspects, which Rawls, however, qualifies in many respects.
Rawls's "Kantian" conception of the person may appear untroubling because it employs
the familiar ideas of freedom and equality, the full significnce of which in this context may
not be apparent. Rawls intends that as "free," we are self-determining and morally responsible, and as "equal," our differential characteristics are not normatively significant. Those
are the two propositions that, I have argued, cannot be rendered consistent with one another except by the idea of normative natural order. As a consequence, Raws's resolution of
the concrete conflicts of interest that arise among persons with all their actual differences
are ad hoc; they have no basis in justice at all. Why is it, for example, that an unequal
distribution must be to the advantage of the least favored; or, on the other hand, why
should there be any inequalities of distribution, at least without unanimous consent? See J.
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 303 (1971). Rawls describes incisively the solutions that would
be reached by persons having the general outlook of thoughtful "liberals" in this country.
The solutions depend, however, on the conventional understanding of such persons. Rawls
perhaps does not intend more than that. See Rawls, supra, at 517, 572. See generally M.
SmAmNL, supra note 5, at 66-103.

See J. RAwLs, supra note 48, at 54 (1971). The two principles are:
First- each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions
and offices open to all.
Id. at 60.
"
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tent of liberty or equality, or both, provides the grounding for a
just social order. 5° To a large extent, current work in political philosophy has consisted of an effort to elaborate that content specifically and concretely.
Every exercise of liberty potentially interferes with the liberty
of someone else, however, and, unless one relies on conventional
understandings, there is nothing in the nature of liberty itself that
tells us which to choose. It may seem obvious-but why is
it?-that my liberty to put my fist in another person's face is
subordinate to his liberty not to be punched. The choice and the
basis for making a choice is far less clear if, for example, we have
to decide whether the liberty to smoke on an airplane outweighs
the restraint on the liberty of someone who wants to fly without
being surrounded by the fumes. If all have liberty to smoke, none
has liberty to fly without breathing smoke-filled air; if all have liberty to fly in clean air, none has liberty to smoke. Which liberty
should prevail? The most likely test in a democratic society is actual preferences: Which of the opposed liberties would most people, after careful reflection, prefer? On that basis, the principle of
liberty is only a principle of majority rule. That may often be the
correct result, but considerations of liberty do not establish it.
Some of the particular liberties especially valued in the United
States are expressly protected against the will of the majority. In
the same way, every other ground for choosing one liberty over another depends on assumptions not provided by the idea of liberty
itself. 1
50 See, R. NOZICK, supra note 30 (primarily liberty); M. WALZER, SrHEREs OF JusTicE
(1983) (primarily equality).
51 Even the choice of liberty to assault someone else or liberty not to be assaulted oneself is not as self-evident as it seems. If all have liberty to walk down the street without
being assaulted, none has liberty to assault another person; if all have equal liberty to assault another person, none has liberty to walk down the street without being assaulted.
Liberty seems manifestly greater in the first case than in the second, because so much of
what one does depends on where one can safely go, and liberty simply to assault someone
else does not seem like much at all. If one generalizes, however, "assault" may refer to any
physical aggression to get what one wants, not such a small matter for those who are strong
enough to be successful aggressors. (Suppose the "aggression" were a matter of wealth
rather than physical strength.) Of course, only the stronger will have the capacity to exercise
that liberty, while all, or almost all, have the capacity to walk down the street. But liberty to
do something does not guarantee that one has the capacity to do it. Every liberty benefits
those who are capable of exercising it and want to do so more than it does those who are not
capable or not interested. Cf. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority,40 U. Chi. L. Rev.
534 (1973) (discussing Rawls's principle of the priority of liberty). Rawls responds to Hart's
criticisms in Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,in 3 Th TANNER LEcTURES ON
HUMAN VALUEs (S. McMurrin ed. 1982).
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The best-known formulation of a general principle of liberty,
John Stuart Mill's assertion that one ought to be at liberty to engage in self-regarding conduct, 52 is notoriously unsatisfactory. Not
only is it unclear what conduct-if indeed any-it plainly covers
but it is doubtful on its own terms." A more limited version of the
same principle, that the enforcement of morality as such is a viola2 Mill's "very simple principle" is
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
J.S. MILL, ON LmERTY 13 (Liberal Arts Press ed. 1956) (1st ed. London 1859). Mill himself
qualified the principle by excepting from its application children and people in "those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage." Id. at 1314.
3The blunt response of James Fitzjames Stephen, Mill's contemporary, was that there
is no significant self-regarding conduct while a community is intact.
[T]he intimate sympathy and innumerable bonds of all kinds by which men are united,
and the differences of character and opinions by which they are distinguished, produce
and must for ever produce continual struggles between them .... The good man and
the bad man, the men whose goodness and badness are of different patterns, are really
opposed to each other. There is a real, essential, eternal conflict between them.
J.F. STEmPN, LIF.RTY, EQuALrrY, FREATmNIy 148 (1967). If the explicit moral struggle that
Stephen described has receded somewhat from public life, nevertheless the distinction between self- and other-regarding conduct is difficult to maintain in a community that recognizes, much more so than did Victorian England, myriad interactions among persons and
affirmative obligations of support, not only of one person by another but of all persons, up
to some level, by the community.
[What is involved is] the negative principle that no one should be coerced for his
own good alone; but no one would gravely argue that this ought to be applied to the
case of children, or of idiots, or insane persons. But if so, can we know a priorithat it
ought to be applied to all sane adults? Since the above-mentioned exceptions are commonly justified on the ground that children, etc., will manifestly be better off if they
are forced to do and abstain as others think best for them; and it is, at least, not
intuitively certain that the same argument does not apply to the majority of mankind
in the present state of their intellectual progress. Indeed, it is often conceded by the
advocates of this principle that it does not hold even in respect of adults in a low state
of civilisation. But if so, what criterion can be given for its application, except that it
must be applied whenever human beings are sufficiently intelligent to provide for
themselves better than others would provide for them? And thus the principle would
present itself not as absolute, but merely a subordinate application of the wider principle of aiming at the general happiness or well-being of mankind."

H.

SIDGwICK,

supra note 6, at 275.

Mill himself quietly gave the show away when he observed: "If either a public officer or
anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be
unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn
him back, without any real infringement of his liberty, for liberty consists in doing what one
desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river." J.S. MmL,supra note 52, at 117. That
case shades into all sorts of other cases in which, it may be said, the person "does not
desire" to do what he is about to do. It all depends on how one identifies the person through
all the temporary and permanent changes that occur during a lifetime.
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tion of liberty, may look unassailable only because it has no concrete applications and, in any event, is far too limited to provide a
significant content for liberty in the modern world; it also depends
on conventional understandings of what counts as an injury.5 4 We
are adrift in a sea of so-called "negative" and "positive" liberties,
but which are negative and which positive depends on where one
starts; that characterization is either indefinite or inconclusive. 55
For all their protests to the contrary, the libertarian's assured definition of liberty assumes a knowledge of human nature and a natural order as certain and metaphysical as anything in Greek tragedy.56 The rest of us struggle uncomfortably with our preferences
and the opposed preferences of others.

" For a defense of the view that the enforcement of morality is always to be condemned as a violation of liberty, see H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmIRTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
Hart's examples are cases of private sexual conduct, which readily elicit the agreement of
many, perhaps most, liberal persons. He argues generally that the distress to others arising
from knowledge of how someone exercises his liberty cannot justify its restriction because if
that is enough, then anything may be enough. Id. at 46-47. The right to liberty by itself
would protect only conduct that no one cared about. Hart assumes that the value of liberty
is great enough to outweigh any amount of distress so caused. But that is far from clear. It is
not difficult to imagine circumstances in which, consequentially at any rate, the distress to
others might count for more than the benefit to the actor: Must the community allow a
latter-day Sade to conduct his experiments in a house in the middle of town, provided no
one is there involuntarily and he takes care that the walls are soundproof and the shades
drawn?
The issue in the end is not enforcement but the moral principles themselves. Rejecting
any authoritative dogma that declares particular sexual conduct to be immoral (or "unnatural") and rejecting the claim of concrete injury, those who object to the enforcement of
morality reduce the opposing moral claim to the conventional judgment that the conduct is
immoral. By itself, however, convention is simply what others think one ought to do. No
more is needed to rule out enforcement than recognition of the actor as self-determining,
that is as a person, without which the question of liberty does not arise at all. The objection
to the enforcement of morality is so strong because once it is run to ground, all that opposes
liberty is a phantom, the assertion of a morality that proves to have no content except the
denial of liberty of others.
85 For the distinction between negative and positive liberty, see Isaiah Berlin's famous
essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, in 1. BERLIN, supra note 24, at 118, 121-34. The distinction
is questioned in MacCallum, Negative and PositiveFreedom, 76 PHi. Rsv. 312 (1967), and
Feinberg, The Idea of a Free Man, in EDUCATIONAL JUDGMENTs 143, 143-47 (J. Doyle ed.
1973), reprintedin J. FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JuSTICE, AND THE BouNDs OF LIBERTY 3, 3-7 (1980).
For example:
Many of the institutions of society which are indispensable conditions for the successful pursuit of our conscious aims are in fact the result of customs, habits or practices which have been neither invented nor are observed with any such purpose in view.
We live in a society in which we can successfully orientate ourselves, and in which our
actions have a good chance of achieving their aims, not only because our fellows are
governed by known aims or known connections between means and ends, but because
they are also confined by rules whose purpose or origin we often do not know and of
whose very existence we are often not aware.
F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LmERTY 11 (1973). The invisible hand is the hand of God.
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Likewise, every human characteristic and aspect of the human
condition is abstractly a candidate for some sort of equality, and
every equality heightens the significance of differential characteristics that remain. Equality of opportunity, the most generally approved principle of equality, does not lead to equality among individual persons at all; on the contrary, it suppresses some
differential characteristics and heightens the differential impact of
others.57 So we are pressed toward the idea of identity, which eliminates altogether the differential characteristics that distinguish us
as individuals."
Not only are abstract liberty and abstract equality by themselves in internal conflict. They are in conflict with one another.
Significant liberty allows a person to distinguish himself and become different, for better or worse, from other persons who use
their liberty differently. Equality in some respect eliminates difference and, with it, the liberty to become different in that respect.
Thus, every liberty not only potentially restricts another liberty,
but, from another perspective, denies equality. Every equality not
only heightens the impact of another inequality, but also denies
some possibility of liberty.
Liberty and equality are not meaningless ideas nor do they
lack significant, reasonably determinate content in our political
and social life. On the contrary, there are many areas of life in
which they have specific content that is largely uncontroversial and
other areas in which their content is openly contested and which
provide testing grounds for their meaning in the future. It would
be bizarre for someone to protest that basing admission to college
on academic potential is a denial of equality because it favors persons with greater academic aptitude, or that giving every person
one and only one vote is a denial of liberty because persons have
no opportunity to increase their political power by voting early and
often. In this country at this time, the frontiers of liberty and
equality are elsewhere. From a broader perspective, however, it is
evident that the frontiers are as much determined by our legal and
57 [T]he equal-opportunity principle really is not very helpful to many men. Under its
regime, a man with, say, an Intelligence Quotient of ninety, is given equal opportunity
to go as far as his native ability will take him. That is to say, it lets him go as far as he

could have gone without the aid of the doctrine-to the bottom rung of the social ladder-while it simultaneously stimulates him to want to go farther.
Schaar, Equality of Opportunity, and Beyond, 9 NOMOS 228, 234 (1967).
" For an argument that the idea of equality in moral and political discussion "is an
empty form having no substantive content of its own," see Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 H~Av. L. Rav. 537, 596 (1982) (footnote omitted).
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other conventions as they are determinative of them. If our expectations are undermined by a shift in public policy, like the introduction of affirmative action into competitions previously based on
more or less understood conceptions of differential merit, the
meanings of liberty and equality become open and unsettled and
by themselves furnish no resolution of the contesting interests.
The conflict between liberty and equality as principles for the
organization of a just society is neither more nor less than the opposition between desert and entitlement in the complete idea of
justice.5 9 That conclusion in itself is not surprising. Within that
portion of our existence that has been wrested from nature and is
within human control, liberty defines the area that positive law
preserves for freedom. It is normal for us to regard a person's exercise of liberty as a basis for judgment about his desert. On the
other hand, except in unusual circumstances when the validity of
the law itself is called into question, an act in compliance with the
law is not a basis for a judgment about desert, since we do not
regard the act as an exercise of liberty, even if the same act would
be a basis for judgment in the absence of the law.60
Once one has in mind the connection between liberty and desert, the inadequacy of the utilitarian defense of liberty becomes
plain. Ignoring desert and considering only liberty's beneficial consequences, the utilitarian regards liberty as if it were no more than
the elimination of one kind of restraint on conduct so that another
more conducive to our well-being can take its place. Liberty is like
removing the stake to which a plant has been tied or releasing an
59 This parallel accounts for the frequent assertion that equality has a peculiarly intimate association with justice, an association that is nevertheless disturbed by the conflicting
demand that a person receive what is uniquely his due and not simply whatever anyone else
has received. See, for example, Hospers's asserted "attempt to handle every problem concerning justice under one or the other of two main headings: equality and desert." J. HosPERs, supra note 2, at 417. See also D. RAPHAEL, supra note 15, at 65-67. In that context,
equality refers not to some particular kind of equal treatment (e.g., one person, one vote),
but to a background order within which all inequalities are according to desert and, therefore, just. See generally Vlastos, supra note 16.
Following the argument made in sections lI-V above, strictly speaking the basis of liberty can only be desert and the basis of equality can only be entitlement. Although the law
may entitle one to liberty, the entitlement qs such is a guaranteed equality, a restriction on
the power or authority of others, to interferb with one's liberty. The full meaning of liberty
can be realized only by the exercise of freedom. We may say not that a person deserves to be
at liberty but that he can be at liberty only as a deserving person. Equality, on the other
hand, is the application of a general rule without more; it pretermits consideration of individual deser.
60 Since the law does not compel in the same way that laws of nature do, a person's act
in compliance with the law might be a basis for an affirmative judgment if he had strong
personal motives to violate the law.
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animal from its tether. It will behave differently than it did under
restraint, and if the untrained growth of the plant or untethered
movement of the animal serves our purposes, the utilitarian case
for liberty is fulfilled. The liberty that we prize, however, is more
than a change of behavior, however beneficial. It is the community's public recognition of the uniquely human attributes of freedom, moral responsibility, and desert.
To just the same extent, however, a community confronts the
conditions of individual desert not as a philosophical problem but
as an intensely practical one. Every departure of the law from what
is deserved-every separation, that is to say, between entitlement
and desert-undermines the connection between liberty and desert
without which liberty as the exercise of freedom is impossible.
Within the political context, the idea of equality expresses this requirement that entitlement be according to desert or, as we say,
just entitlements. Principles of equality in the abstract do not
eliminate difference or the liberty on which difference depends.
Rather they limit the range of liberty to those differences and their
results that are (perceived to be) just.
In the same way and for the same reasons that desert and entitlement tend toward absoluteness, the ideas of liberty and equality carry us toward the formulation of "absolute" principles that
are said to be objective and valid without regard to particular circumstances, which principles are united in the ideal of a just community."1 This tendency of our thought is evident not only in formal discussions, but even more so in political debate about
concrete issues. If the social consensus is strong, issues are likely to
be contested on grounds of public policy that refer to the needs
and choices of the community. The increments of liberty and
equality that result from adoption of one proposal or another are
understood to be matters of ordinary legal entitlement, which are
authoritatively granted or withdrawn by rules of law and which
one may like or dislike but which one accepts among the vicissitudes of community life. If consensus is lacking, liberty or equality
itself may be asserted "absolutely" as the primary and sufficient
ground for a proposal; considerations of public policy are treated
61 A notable exception to this tendency is Michael Walzer's recent book, Spheres of
Justice, in which he argues that social justice depends on "complex equality," which takes
its meaning in large part from the conventional understandings of the community. M.
WALzER, supra note 50, at 17 & passim. See Ronald Dworkin's critical comments about this
aspect of Walzer's book in Dworkin, To Each His Own (Book Review), N.Y. REv. oF BooKS,
Apr. 14, 1983, at 4.
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as collateral or forgotten altogether. If the absolute principle is
challenged in turn, the response is that it is a requirement of
justice. 2
When the individual interests are large and explicit, public debate may be at more than one level, and arguments shift ambiguously from one level to another. Discussions of affirmative action,
for example, are greatly complicated by the difficulty of separating
arguments that depend on assumed or demonstrable social consequences from those that do not. Similarly, arguments that widespread homosexuality would have harmful consequences for some
generally shared social objectives (whether the arguments have any
validity or not) do not meet the argument that private, consensual
sexual practices belong fundamentally within the range of liberty
and ought to be protected for that reason. Unless the arguments
are sorted out and the difference between them understood, those
who maintain opposed positions talk past one another and are
likely to construe the failure to join issue as an indication of their
opponents' obtuseness or bad faith.
Strikingly, introduction of the idea of justice endorses the absoluteness of a principle without affecting its content. Extensions
of suffrage, integrated schools, improved public housing, and a
minimum wage have all been described as fundamental aspects
of
liberty or equality, claimed on grounds of political, social, or economic justice alone. At the end of the 1960's, more and more
claims were asserted in that fashion absolutely. Far from characterizing a claim further or qualifying it in any way, the reference to
justice was intended (and received) precisely as an assertion that it
was unnecessary to offer further arguments in its defense. To some
observers it seemed that questions of public policy to which there
was no certain answer were being presented unreasonably as bare
demands that could be resolved only by a test of strength. To
others, the claims were evidence that American society was fundamentally unjust.
62 The first response may be a reference to an authoritative text, if one is available, like
the Constitution. If the meaning of the text is then questioned and the proffered meaning is
not accepted on other grounds, unless the discussion breaks off at that point, a reference to
justice follows. It is an American peculiarity that all questions of political philosophy are
converted into questions of constitutional law. The results, as exercises in textual analysis,
are frequently extraordinary. For just one example among many, see Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1 (1964), in which Justice Black for the Court declared that the provision in article
I, § 2, of the Constitution that Members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen
"'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." Id. at 7-8 (footnotes
omitted).
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We are never asked to prefer liberty or equality to justice, or
the reverse. Opponents of a claim, likewise, never concede the fundamental argument about liberty or equality and deny that the
claim is just; nor do they concede that a claim is just but argue
that liberty or equality is too important to be sacrificed to justice.
Although liberty and equality are reciprocal and opposed, there is
no divergence between liberty and justice or between equality and
justice. Perceiving the multitude of conflicting claims that parade
under the banner of justice, the ease with which the banner is run
up and down, and its lack of significance for the content of a claim,
one may be inclined to disregard the association of liberty and
equality with justice, as a rhetorical flourish. But in the case of
serious, substantial claims, at any rate, the association seems too
insistent and appropriate to be only that; it is not superficial.
Confronting the variety of claims, we may look hopefully to
nature for guidance. The weight of long, well-established practice
may give some principles the appearance of being "natural," so
that any departure looks like an interference with the natural order. But nature expresses its preferences authoritatively, in its own
laws, or not at all. Once we have acquired and recognized a capacity to affect natural circumstances in some way, so that liberty or
equality is seriously in issue, a decision whether and how to exercise the capacity is unavoidable. A reference to what is natural
may for some purposes distinguish crudely between the complex,
sustained interventions characteristic of modern civilization and
the simpler, more direct ones of a primitive society. Beyond that, it
is simply meaningless to speak of one manner of social organization as more natural than another.6 3
From the individual perspective as well, it is meaningless to
speak of the "natural person" as if that referred to values found in
nature itself. Human life as we know it is possible only in community, and we cannot isolate the contribution of nature from the inescapable effects of some form of nurture. Although some endowments may seem more independent of nurture than others, even
they derive their value and significance, whether positive or negative, from human convention. A community's modes of individual
Is On the whole, it appears to me that no definition that has ever been offered of the
Natural exhibits this notion as really capable of furnishing an independent ethical first
principle. And no one maintains that 'natural' like 'beautiful' is a notion that though
indefinable is yet clear, being derived from a simple unanalysable impression. Hence I
see no way of extracting from it a definite practical criterion of the rightness of actions.
H. SMGWxCK, supra note 6, at 83. See generally id. at 80-83.
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and group behavior may seem to its members natural and uncontrived, and it may be difficult to change them. Those are matters
of psychological (or sociological) and technological importance,
which may have a bearing on that community's choice of policies.
Although it may sometimes seem otherwise, they do not supply the
absolute principles of liberty and equality that we lack.
We may conclude from the foregoing that the political ideal of
a just community, founded on principles that have objective and
not merely conventional validity, is not only unattainable in practice but is not susceptible of coherent exposition. Liberty and
equality cannot be realized "objectively," because they are contradictory; nor can one exist without the other. Every significant liberty is a departure from the determinate background of desert that
is assumed by liberty itself. The community of perfect liberty is
Hobbes's state of nature, in which there are no entitlements and
each person has what his natural abilities allow him to procure."
But, unless we assume that nature itself is morally orderly, it is
liberty without responsibility or freedom (or, as Hobbes perceived,
justice"5 ), because there can be no desert. A fully determinate
background order would eliminate liberty altogether. The community of perfect equality is the society imagined by Plato in the Republic, in which each person's role is fully determined according to
his nature. Entitlements leaving no room for autonomous action at
all; once again desert, and therefore responsibility and freedom,
are eliminated. 6
Yet we can no more do without the ideas of liberty and equality than we can do without the idea of freedom. They are present
to us as soon as the collective human capacity to modify the natural order in any of its respects is recognized. They are concomitants of the experience of freedom within a human community.
Evidently, we require some idea of "practical justice" to serve for
our ordinary lives in place of the unattainable ideal.
Liberty can be described metaphorically as space for one's self,
space within which to realize one's self by effective decisions.
Given the limitations of human existence, at any time all but a
tiny portion of the abstract possibilities of self-determination inev" The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale,is the Liberty each
man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own
Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in
his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
T. HOBBES, LEViATHAN 66 (Everyman ed. 1914) (1st ed. London 1651).
65 Id. at 66.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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itably are not even perceived as such and remain outside the area
of actual interest and concern.6 7 For most Americans near the end
of the twentieth century, the possibilities of cultivating snapdragons, keeping a pet tiger, and selling a kidney are in this category.
Other possibilities are perceived and wanted, with varying degrees
of intensity, but their denial still leaves the self intact, with ample
space for realization in other ways. Some possibilities of self-determination, however, may be attached so closely and inescapably to
the conception of self that one accepts that their restriction is felt
as a diminution of self, whatever countless other possibilities remain. For contemporary Americans, the core of the freedoms of
expression and religion protected by the first amendment, freedom
of unrestricted domestic travel, and the core of the fifth amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination are among
the fundamental liberties of this kind. So also are some aspects of
private, personal conduct, including, probably, sexual behavior and
the intimacies of nuclear family life. In other societies the list
would be different.
Equality ensures that space for one's self is real space, measured not by wishes but by effective action. It is the difference between liberty to fly to the Caribbean by flapping one's arms if one
can and the real liberty to have a holiday in the Caribbean that is
conferred by a sufficiently high minimum wage. Innumerable differences between ourselves and others pass below, or sometimes
above, the level of our concern. They may affect the size or shape
of our real space in ways that we care about, while still regarding
our comparative disadvantage as one of the multitude of ordinary
differences that distinguish one person from another. A disadvantage begins to be perceived as an inequality and becomes intolerable if it renders ineffective a possibility of self-determination that
is central to one's conception of self, so that the disadvantage is no
longer merely a difference from others but a diminution of one's
self.
Most of us obtain a conception of self not by abstract imagination or reflection but from acquaintance and constant interaction
with our surroundings. We learn who and what we are and what we
17 Compare the observation of Hobbes:
For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be Rules enough to
set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing
impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the law praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most
profitable to themselves.
T. HOBBES, supra note 64, at 111.
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may become by observing others like ourselves. It is only the Miniver Cheevies who define themselves so grandly that they mourn
the ordinary conditions of existence, which are the same for all
alike."' Even a harsh, idiosyncratic incapacity, like a physical deformity, may be absorbed and the resulting impossibility of selfdetermination accepted as part of the conception of self, rather
than a diminution of self, if it is unreservedly so treated by other
people. So also, a person may not be disturbed by a comparison
with others if they are generally regarded as so completely unlike
himself or are so much more powerful or wealthy or "higher up"
that the liberties that they have and he lacks are not part of his
conception of self at all. We are diminished far more if we are on
the wrong side of differences between ourselves and others more
palpably our "equals."
A harmonious community will subscribe to principles of liberty and equality that are congruent and give a coherent shape to
its members' conceptions of self. In addition, the principles of liberty and equality will be coherent with the community's customs
and habits and correspond generally to the facts of ordinary life.
Insofar as those conditions are fulfilled, the members of the community will find that their conceptions of self are generally satisfied, and the community will have achieved a just social order.
That does not mean that it will have found perfect justice or that
other communities necessarily depart from justice if they adopt
different principles and practices. There is no perfect justice nor is
there a unique social order that comes closest to it.
The problem of affirmative action for a previously disadvantaged minority has produced the most explicit and persistent concrete conflict about the nature of justice in recent American life.
Although the particular shape and scope of the problem is rooted
in our history, it is a specification of the abstract contradiction between liberty and equality themselves. It is so intractable because
the competing claims have no coherence within the social order
generally, and there is no perceptible path toward coherence. If the
minority is preferred, we deny the significance of desert for some
members of the majority, who lose out although they are individually more deserving according to the understood criteria than some

68 Robinson, Miniver Cheevy, in THE OxFoPD BOOK OF AmERcAN VERSE 486-87 (1950).
In Camus's play, Caligula, the Roman emperor seeks to overcome the conditions of existence. He demands the moon. A. CAMUS, CALIGULA, in CALIGULA SUMvi DE IE MALEN'rENDU 11155 (Gallimard 1958), reprinted in English in A. CAMus, THE CoLLEcTEO PLAYS OF ALBERT
CAMus. (S. Gilbert trans. 1965).
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members of the minority who benefit. If the minority is not preferred, we deny the significance of desert so far as some of them
are concerned; without affirmative action, no "equality of opportunity" is sufficient, because differential entitlements in the past
have made them undeservedly less able to compete. We may turn
for a solution to considerations of utility, the future well-being of
the community or more immediate social needs, as some courts
have done. But a solution on that basis will not relieve the sense of
injustice of those whose personal well-being suffers. There is no
correct principle of liberty or equality in such a situation; the effects of principles applied in the past, which are now believed to
have been wrong, can be undone only by the application of principles that also appear to be wrong. Rather, coherent principles of
liberty and equality need to emerge together and to become a part,
seriously and substantially, of the community's way of life. 9
The requirement of coherence of principles that are not themselves absolute helps also to explain other phenomena that are too
persistent to be dismissed as irrelevant to the idea of justice. There
is typically an explosion of demands for justice in a social setting
when things are getting better, not worse. This effect of "rising expectations" is not merely psychological. Large social changes are
rarely made in tandem. The inconsistencies and incongruities between principle and practice and between some principles or practices and others that result from such changes are perceived and
articulated as injustice, even though previous conditions of greater
denial perhaps were not. So also, we perceive injustice in the treatment of someone in our own community without perceiving injustice in the far worse treatment of someone halfway round the
world. Abstractly, individual desert does not depend on nationality, but in a world of nation states, we rely on national boundaries
to limit the extension of our principles and our practices. An internal incoherence that is perceived as injustice may not be noticed or
felt at all in a similar pattern of external facts.
In a sense, therefore, convention does replace nature. Some order there must be. Looking in vain to nature for a standard of justice, able neither to formulate absolute principles to satisfy the
ideal of a just community nor to abandon the attempt, we rely
finally on the order that we experience, an amalgam of principles
and practice.7 0 In so doing, we run the risk that we shall confuse
69 For a particularly perceptive discussion of utilitarian considerations and claims of

desert with respect to affirmative action, see M. SDnEL, supra note 5, at 135-47.
70 Compare the conclusion of Michael Walzer:
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the familiar with the necessary; but what other choice have we?
VIII. LAW AND JUSTICE:

Neither legal positivism nor natural law accommodates the
complete idea of justice. Positivism readily accounts for justice as
entitlement. The rules of law that are valid according to its criteria
create real entitlements, acknowledged as such within the legal order. It is permanently subject, however, to the objection that a rule
of law is wrong, not merely as a matter of policy but fundamentally
as a matter of justice, and ought not be observed. Natural law accounts for desert. Its principles are the unlimited moral principles
that underlie particular moral judgments and conclusions about individual desert. As it is currently conceived, however, natural law
is permanently subject to the objection that it is concerned not
with law but with morality. It is one thing to assert what ought to
be the law or that the law is bad and ought to be changed, quite
another to say what is the law or that because a law is wrong it is
not the law.
The testing case for positivism and natural law alike is one in
which entitlement and desert are opposed. Focusing on their respective inadequacies, the test of positivism emphasizes the immorality or undeservedness of the entitlement and the test of natural
law emphasizes the entitlement's firm acknowledgment in the law.
The defender of natural law points to any of the most immoral
Nazi laws that imposed catastrophic, undeserved suffering. If those
are laws, he asks, what can law have to do with justice? The positivist calls attention to an especially firm entitlement according to
a settled rule of law that is nevertheless agreed to be immoral: the
fugitive slave law in antebellum America or apartheid laws in
South Africa.7 1 If those are not laws, what are, and what distinJustice is relative to social meanings. Indeed, the relativity of justice follows from the
classic non-relative definition, giving each person his due, as much as it does from my
own proposal, distributing goods for "internal" reasons. These are formal definitions
that require, as I have tried to show, historical completion. We cannot say what is due
to this person or that one until we know how these people relate to one another
through the things they make and distribute. There cannot be a just society until there
is a society; and the adjective just doesn't determine, it only modifies, the substantive
life of the societies it describes. There are an infinite number of possible lives, shaped
by an infinite number of possible cultures, religions, political arrangements, geographical conditions, and so on. A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a
certain way-that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members.
M. WALzER, supra note 50, at 312-13.
7 The Nazi laws do not provide good test cases because they did not become well settled. The Nazis were in power for less than a dozen years altogether, during half of which
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guishes law from morality?
Each is inadequate because it disregards the aspect of justice
that the other respects. Legal positivism observes accurately that it
is on the basis of actual practice and acknowledgment within the
legal system, not moral judgment, that we regard a law as valid
and recognize an entitlement under it.7 2 Furthermore, we ordinarily give effect to entitlements and believe that we should do so,
even if our individual moral judgment is conflicting. When positivism makes this limited validity of a rule within the legal order a
basis for judgment and action, however, it depends on an assumption that the law's validity is unlimited. Although in specific cases
the move from limited to unlimited validity may be questioned, as
it is in the case of the Nazi law, it cannot be questioned generally
without eliminating entitlement as a concept distinct from desert
and undermining the whole positivist case. But if the move is ever
properly questioned, it is always subject to question. The positivist
solution to the problem of immoral law is internally inconsistent,
or at least it treats law as a phenomenon other than the one that
functions in everyday life. If the positivist solution is correct, it is
hard to see why we care what the law is, which is all that the posi73
tivist proposes to tell us.
The practical weakness and danger of legal positivism arises
from its inability to find any place within its system for the idea of
natural moral order. Insisting that positive law alone is concrete
and definitive, and excluding from its purview any other source of
order, positivism does not overcome the brute facts of our experience, freedom and desert, that lead us to the idea of a background
order of desert. From its own point of view, positivism insists
above all on individual moral freedom and responsibility, but it

the nation was in a general state of war. That has enabled defenders of natural law to deny
the status of law to Nazi decrees without confronting the problem of entitlement directly.
Were we not blinded by the vision of a nation-state, we might on quite neutral grounds
conclude that the harshest decrees of the Nazis, which had the least connection with prior
German law, were not laws but the exercise of naked force. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at
940-41.
72

See, for example, the discussion of the "rule of recognition" in H.L.A. HART, THE

CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961).

73 Lon Fuller described the positivist as posing a choice between "giving food to a starving man and being mimsy with the borogroves." Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
Reply to Professor Hart,71 HARv. L. REv. 630, 656 (1958). Kelsen understood this difficulty
of positivism precisely. His reaction was to say- It is none of my business why you care. The
fact is that you do. I do my job if I describe accurately that about which you care. See H.
KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 105 (M. Knight trans. 1967). Keisen's solution is analytically sound. Even so, one feels that a description that rejects as irrelevant so large a feature
of the subject being studied must be incomplete.
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cannot have them without the background order that it insistently
rejects.
As a result, since positive law embraces all human relationships within a community, it tends itself to become a cosmology
and to invoke the legitimacy of the authority of the state, not simply as a matter of positive law but absolutely. However resolutely
legal positivists deny that the state has such authority, the tendency persists, because in the absence of any other cosmology the
human mind requires it. We do not create the universe by our theorizing. What is and what ought to be are different questions; no
effort of human ratiocination will change that. But in the effort to
account for our experience of freedom we are driven to draw the
two together.
Justice springs from coherence and order. Without them, there
is no justice. But they may also be attributes of a community that
is brutally unjust. Human experience suggests that if coherence
and order are achieved, persistent injustice will gradually acquire a
mantle of rightness. In such a situation, the abstractions of natural
law considered by themselves as external to the legal order are not
likely to be more of a safeguard than simply principles of morality.
If the idea of natural law as a necessary qualification to the sufficiency of positive law is preserved and moral principles are insistently summoned to challenge the law from within, the conversion
of an unjust Leviathan into a "mortal god"7 may be postponed
and, finally, prevented. It may also make us dissatisfied under a
rule of law that is on the whole decent and just. But the restless
pursuit of perfect justice, even if it is unattainable, does not seem
unfortunate.
Natural law is inadequate because it refuses to acknowledge
the validity of a law and the entitlements that depend on it despite
indicia that ordinarily are sufficient to establish them. There is no
error in the stance that subjects laws to moral criticism and disapproves, or even condemns, adherence to an immoral law. The
guard of a concentration camp or someone who accepts the benefits of an unjust expropriation may appropriately be assailed for
failing from lack of courage or will to oppose application of the
law.75 That is a specifically individual moral stance, however,
which dismisses the importance of applying acknowledged rules,
despite one's preference, on whatever ground, for a different rule.
74 T. HoBBs, supra note 64, at 89.
5 One may think of some of the Americans who acquired property in California that
had belonged to Japanese-Americans forcibly relocated during World War 1.
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A failure to perceive the immorality of a law or to oppose it is not
often a demonstrable error, as a failure to read a statute correctly
or a failure to remember and apply the correct procedure may be.
The difference in that respect may not seem large if one chooses
the most monstrously immoral law as an example and isolates it
from its legal and social context. But the immoralities of the law
once it has become established are not often so clear.
The practical weakness and danger of natural law is that it
may discourage reliance on the rule of law generally. In a turbulent
community, claims based on a higher law or the justice of nature
itself may come from many sides. The collective judgment embodied in established law is a brake against the disorder in which, deprived of their previous entitlements, the weakest members of the
community fare worst. A society that relies entirely on desert without benefit of entitlement is not likely to be less unjust than one in
which entitlements, however imperfect, are preserved. Unless it is
embodied in entitlements, desert is individual and can be realized
only in the natural order itself. In practical effect, that means that
the strongest prevails.
Hobbes, rejecting altogether the idea of natural justice,
pointed out as clearly as anyone the consequence of separating
positive law from natural law. It is the unlimited authority of the
state to determine every aspect of our lives according to the entitlements of positive law. However "incommodious" that may be,
he thought, the alternative was the state of nature in which the
only law was the law of nature, liberty unconstrained by desert.1
Plato, who accepted the idea of natural justice without reservation,
pointed out the consequence of identifying positive law too closely
with natural law. Perfect justice is embodied in entitlements so
complete that individual freedom vanishes in the realization of a
just community.7 7 Again, the authority of the state is unlimited.
The extremes meet. All that is left to distinguish them is the label,
which, as Hobbes reminds us, is also a human device. 8

IX. FREEDOM AND ORDER
Beyond the jurisprudential debate, the antinomy between desert and entitlement leads finally to the ontological antinomy between freedom and cause. The possibility of freedom seems to de-

T. HOBBES, supra note 64, at 96.
7 PLATO, supra note 1.
Is T. HOBBES, supra note 64, at 29-30.
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pend on regularity and orderliness of occurrence, which we know
only as cause. The dependence holds in the very constitution of the
free, acting self, for unless the self comes into being according to
some order, it must be only momentary and accidental and conduct would lose the quality of individual action. We should have
only a series of discrete acts, not united by their association with a
"self," so the notion of action also would have no meaning. And
generally, unless events in the world in which we act occur according to causal laws, we should not be able to ascribe effects to our
conduct at all, and again the quality of actions would be lost.7 But
if causal order governs human action, individual desert, which is
the expression of freedom, seems to be overthrown. If the self is
constituted by causes in an unbroken sequence, how can a person
be individually responsible for his actions? And if events occur according to causal laws, then a background order of desert, without
which individual desert and freedom are lost, is excluded. One can
see why the Greeks insisted on a kind of desert that is not dependent on individual action, so that Oedipus deserved what was altogether beyond his power to avoid or control. If that seems like
hopeless confusion about the meaning of freedom and desert, what
have we to offer in its place?
Making a way through such obscurities, one may seem to have
grasped a solution, if only the last piece could be fit into place. But
it is not like that. We do not explain or account for freedom at all.
Freedom and cause are primitive, unanalyzable ordering concepts
of our experience. We know them directly from our experience. Together, they are the means by which we separate the individual self
from its surroundings. If we try to abandon either one for the
other, experience itself collapses.8 0
The Greek conception of moira e1 and the doctrine of natural
law contained in Thomas Aquinas's great Christian synthesis"2 ac-

79 Except, perhaps, in a very limited sense referring to one's own sensations. See supra
note 27. Those also, however, can be described as events in the world; in any case, they
would have to occur according to causal laws.
80 It may be a question whether the concept of causation has any meaning without a
distinguishing concept of freedom. The Kantian solution is that causation would have no
application to things in themselves, unexperienced by a distinct self. So far as it is possible
to say anything at all about that, I have generally subscribed to that approach here.
But-still following Kant-I do not see how one can say anything without introducing the
distinct self that is supposed to be left aside.
81Roughly, fate. The concept of normative natural order appears in various forms pervasively in classical Greek.
82 T.
LOGICA

AQUINAS, SuMMA THEOLOGIAE, I, questions 90-97, translated in 1 SuMMA THEO-

993-1025 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1947). Especially rele-
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knowledged the paradox of human freedom as the central fact of
our experience. Inevitably, they accounted for it by metaphysical
principles that removed the explanation beyond the limits of
human comprehension. Renunciation of that kind of metaphysics
and the substitution of empirically verifiable, effective modes of
explaining the phenomena of our experience have led to the replacement of the Greek and Christian concepts with the concept of
justice, not as it had been used earlier but as a limited, specifically
normative concept. The terms of the discussion have shifted from
ontology to ethics and politics, but we are no closer to a solution.
We simply get along as a practical matter, as, after all, our predecessors did also. Neither at the individual level nor at the specifically political level are we able to account satisfactorily for the
phenomenon of individual desert. Nor can we dispense with it.
Perfect justice is not attainable; it is an irrational ideal.
There should be no mistake about that. If we have relegated
moira and the Christian God to the domains of myth and religion,
we have nothing to put in their place. The area of express tension
has shifted, nothing more. We are now able to give satisfactory
causal explanations for natural occurrences that once seemed to require (and to permit) explanation in terms of desert. The social
sciences have gone on to explain individual conduct by causal laws
that do without desert. If it seems like a pleasant myth that the
"will of Zeus" was fulfilled by the destruction of Troy,"" not long
from now it may seem like a myth that individual will rather than
the chemical constituents of the body or orderly and predictable
psychiatric phenomena accounts for some of our conduct. The
method and objective of the social sciences calls for the continuing
extension of causal laws to larger areas of human behavior. Nothing in the record so far indicates a limit to their success. We may
suppose that there is an indissoluble core of freedom and action
that will remain. But the supposition is supported only by the indubitable experience of freedom itself.
Increasing control over nature by the discovery of its laws increases human freedom in one sense. We are freed from subjection
to unalterable conditions of existence and can reshape them to approximate more closely a concrete idea of justice. The "accidents"
of nature, whether they are unforeseen calamities and strokes of
fortune or simply the arbitrary distribution of endowments, can
more nearly be corrected. In terms used in this article, entitlement,
vant are questions 93, discussing eternal law, and 94, discussing natural law. Id. at 1003-13.
"HomER, supra note 8, bk. 1, line 5, at 11.
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determined by human positive law, encroaches on the natural order, and we are able to establish a background order of desert
where it had previously to be assumed.
From another point of view, human freedom is not increased.
Once we have reduced phenomena to order and learned the causes
that make their occurrence determinate, no room is left for desert.
We understand that where freedom is absent, there is no desert. It
is equally true that if the idea of desert no longer pertained to any
of our experience, the idea of freedom would have vanished as well.
It is pointless to ask whether that would be a good or a bad thing.
The question could not arise.
I see no particular reason to suppose that that transformation
will not occur. Just as fate and original sin are no longer part of
the explanation of our experience, another transformation might
eliminate individual moral responsibility and desert. If that occurs,
it will not be because a new theory is announced from some academic or scientific citadel. It will be the product of accumulated
facts and a slowly accumulating shift in the fundamental conceptual system by which facts are ordered. I have no idea what such a
world would be like. The difficulty of imagining it can be suggested
by trying to describe some event involving-as we think- responsible human behavior in wholly causal terms that altogether dispense with human action. A world so described would be an entirely new world.84 It seems to me that the worlds of classical
Greece and medieval Christianity, as they were experienced, may
have been not simply different states of our own but different
worlds entirely. If there is such a thing as absolute truth, the best
case for it here may be that we are able to enter into the Greek
and Christian worlds and find ourselves.
In our own world, freedom and cause coexist inconsistently
and with equal necessity. The inconsistency rarely troubles us in
practice, and it engages us theoretically more than it disturbs us.
The effort to transcend considerations of social utility and to realize justice prevents measurement of what ought to be by what is
and preserves an essentially human tension between a static and a
dynamic social order. There is continuity between the old cosmologies and our own. The issue now, as then, is meaningful freedom
within a morally indifferent universe. Henry Adams observed,
"Chaos was the law of nature; Order was the dream of man."85 We
" See Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. AcAD. 187 (1962), reprinted

in P. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT 1 (1974).
85 H. ADAMs, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMs 451 (E. Samuels ed. 1974).
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neither achieve what we aspire to achieve, nor give over the aspiration. Which is just as well.

